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I. INTRODUCTION
Federal preemption arguments in tort actions have proliferated
over the last few years. The Supreme Court's decision in Cipollone
v. Liggett Group, Inc.,' announced on June 24, 1992, triggered a
notable upsurge in the successful use of preemption as a defense
to products liability lawsuits. In an opinion issued less than one
month after Cipollone, Judge Jack Weinstein cautioned that "t] oo
ready a tendency to declare the state protective shield replaced by
the still somewhat spotty federal protections will leave many
injured persons without recourse."2 Rather than heed this admonition, a number of courts apparently have viewed Cipollone as a
mandate to dismantle the protections of state tort law, even in
extreme situations in which the defendant has not complied with
the federal requirements that are being given preemptive effect.
One decision from the United States District Court for the
District of Massachusetts, recently affirmed by the First Circuit,
provides a remarkable illustration of this tendency. In Talbott v.
C.R. Bard, Inc.,' a manufacturer of cardiac catheters successfully invoked the preemption defense in a wrongful death action
notwithstanding that it had already pled guilty to numerous

1. 505 U.S. 504 (1992).
2. Burke v. Dow Chem. Co., 797 F.
ers and others must still look to the
against harmful toxic substances.").
3. 865 F. Supp. 37 (D. Mass. 1994),
cert. filed, 64 U.S.L.W. 3593 (U.S. Feb.

Supp. 1128, 1132 (E.D.N.Y. 1992) ("Consumgreat font of state tort law for protection
affd, 63 F.3d 25 (1st Cir. 1995), petition for
16, 1996) (No. 95-1321).
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charges of filing false statements with the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) and other statutory violations, infractions for
which the company was ordered to pay $61 million in civil and
criminal penalties.4 Although conceding that this decision "'may
cause some, including those who enacted the law, to question..., complete preemption of private rights of action," both
courts in Talbott felt compelled to effectuate what they regarded
as the "clearly expressed" intent of Congress.5
Increasingly, defendants assert federal preemption as a defense in tort litigation involving, among others, medical devices,
pesticides, hazardous chemicals, automobiles, and railroads.
This practice represents a departure from the traditional application of preemption as a barrier only to conflicting state and
local legislation and regulation, and, more disturbingly, the use
of the preemption defense in tort litigation sometimes immunizes defendants from liability irrespective of their conduct. Indeed,
as argued herein, lower courts have misinterpreted Cipollone by
finding broad preemption of tort claims under other federal
safety statutes when the Supreme Court really had nothing
more than the "government standards" defense in mind, a defense that would absolve a company of liability only upon a
showing of compliance with a relevant safety requirement.'
Several questions concerning the proper application of the
preemption defense remain unresolved. Because the scope of
federal preemption primarily turns on matters of statutory construction, the subject defies simple unitary treatment. Indeed, as
applied by the courts, the preemption defense lacks any single,
coherent meaning. Nonetheless, these statutory preemption
provisions pose important recurring problems. Perhaps the most
relevant question concerns the consequence of finding express
4. Id. at 39; see also Barbara Carton, Bard Former Executives Are Convicted of
Concealing Data on Heart Catheters, WALL ST. J., Aug. 25, 1995, at B2 (reporting
that Bard "paid a $61 million fine to the government-the largest ever imposed
nationwide in an FDA investigation").
5. Talbott v. C.R. Bard, Inc., 63 F.3d 25, 31 (1st Cir. 1995) (quoting Talbott, 865
F. Supp. at 40), petition for cert. filed, 64 U.S.L.W. 3593 (U.S. Feb. 16, 1996) (No.
95-1321).
6. See infra part W.B. The Court may clarify some of these issues later this
Term. See Lohr v. Medtronic, Inc., 56 F.3d 1335 (11th Cir. 1995), cert. granted, 116
S. Ct. 806 (1996).
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preemption in any particular case: Does such a finding mean
that tort claims within the preempted domain may never be
brought against a company or, instead, may a plaintiff sustain
such claims by introducing evidence of noncompliance with federal safety standards? If the latter is true, does noncompliance
defeat the preemption defense entirely, or is it the basis for the
only type of claim that survives after Congress decides to preempt nonidentical state safety standards for a product or activity? This Article provides tentative answers to these and other
perplexing questions.
Part II sketches the Supreme Court's changing treatment of
the preemption defense. In the decade before Cipollone, the
Court expressed a marked reluctance to find preemption of common-law tort claims, but its decisions from the last several
Terms suggest a significant reversal in this attitude. Part III
canvasses the lower courts' recent receptiveness to preemption
arguments under various federal statutes, and it then categorizes these decisions into three competing interpretations of the
preemption defense. One can differentiate among these interpretations based in large measure on whether compliance is relevant and on which party shoulders the burden of proof on that
issue: (1) under the "strong" version, preemption entirely forecloses state tort remedies, even in cases in which the defendant
has not complied with federal safety requirements; (2) under an
"intermediate" version, plaintiffs may pursue claims within the
preempted domain only for a violation of the federal safety requirements; (3) under the "weak" version, the defendant must
prove compliance as a predicate for invoking the defense, and
the plaintiff may still defeat preemption by showing that the
defendant misled agency officials.
Finally, Part IV suggests alternatives to the exaggerated reading of Cipollone that a number of courts have adopted, especially
those adhering to the strong version. For instance, to ensure
that plaintiffs are not deprived entirely of a remedy, courts
might reconsider the possibility of finding implied private rights
of action under these federal statutes. Barring that, the Court's
decision in Cipollone makes the most sense if interpreted as
announcing a federal common-law rule accepting the government standards defense rather than as a true preemption de-
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fense available in tort actions.
I.

SUPREME COURT RECOGNITION OF PREEMPTION
AS A DEFENSE IN COMMON-LAW TORT ACTIONS

Under the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution,7 federal law may supersede state law in a number of circumstances.' First, Congress may, by statute, expressly preempt
state law.' Second, in the absence of express statutory preemption, congressional intent to preempt state law sometimes may
be inferred when a comprehensive scheme of federal regulation

leaves no room for supplementation by state law.'0 Finally,
even in the absence of implied preemption of an entire field of

regulation, state law is preempted to the extent that it stands as
an obstacle to the implementation of congressional objectives"
or actually conflicts with federal law. 2 Although the Court's
Supremacy Clause jurisprudence dates back nearly two centuries and the preemption of state law is at least half as old,'
federal preemption of tort claims is of a much more recent vintage. Apart from preemption of claims under certain federal

7. U.S. CoNsT. art. VI, cl. 2. Arguably, preemption is not properly regarded as
grounded in the Supremacy Clause at all. See Stephen A. Gardbaum, The Nature of
Preemption, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 767, 782 (1994) ("[Tihe power of preemption derives
from the Necessary and Proper Clause; it is authorized as a means of effectuating
other congressional powers. It has nothing to do with the Supremacy Clause.").
Nonetheless, the Court continues to frame its analysis by reference to Article VI. See
id. at 802.
8. See generally English v. General Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 78-79 & n.5 (1990)
(describing the three basic preemption categories); S. Candice Hoke, Preemption Pathlogies and Civic Republican Values, 71 B.U. L. REV. 685, 733-37 (1991) (criticizing
the incoherence of the Court's different preemption categories); Paul Wolfson, Preemption and Federalism: The Missing Link, 16 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 69, 70-88
(1988) (same).
9. See, e.g., Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 108 (1983); Jones v. Rath
Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 530-32 (1977).
10. See, e.g., Schneidewind v. ANR Pipeline Co., 485 U.S. 293, 300 (1988); Rice v.
Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947).
11. See, e.g., International Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S, 481, 494 (1987); Hines
v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941).
12. See, e.g., California Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272, 281
(1987); Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151, 158 (1978); Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142-43 (1963).
13. See Gardbaum, supra note 7, at 785-805.
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statutes that provided exclusive remedies,' the Court did not
directly confront this issue until 1984."
Over the course of the last decade, the United States Supreme
Court has struggled to define the extent to which federal safety
regulation may foreclose recovery under state tort law. Consistent with its oft-repeated presumption against the displacement
of state authority, 6 the Court initially declined to extend preemption to common-law tort actions. 7 Although this reluctance
was still evident to some extent in Cipollone, the Court's 1992
plurality decision represented a significant watershed because it
found preemption of some tort claims. 8 More recent decisions
suggest that this controversial holding is now well-accepted by
the members of the Court. 19
A. TraditionalReluctance To Find Preemption of Tort Claims
In Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp.,20 a closely divided Court
addressed the availability of punitive damages in an action for
radiation injuries. Just the previous year, in Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. State Energy Resources Conservation & Development
Commission,2 ' the Court had decided that the Atomic Energy

14. See infra notes 65-66 and accompanying text.
15. See Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238 (1984); infra notes 20-39 and
accompanying text.
16. See, e.g., New York State Conf. of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 115 S. Ct. 1671, 1676 (1995); Hillsborough County v. Automated Medical Lab., 471 U.S. 707, 715 (1985); Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 746 (1981);
Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947). Wholly apart from the
Court's traditional presumption against preemption, a well-established canon of statutory construction disfavors implied repeals of the common law. See Norfolk Redev. &
Hous. Auth. v. Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co., 464 U.S. 30, 35 (1983); 3 NoRMAN
J. SINGER, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CoNsTRucTIoN §§ 61.01-.05 (5th ed. 1992).
17. See Philip H. Corboy & Todd A. Smith, Federal Preemption of Product Liability Law: Federalism and the Theory of Implied Preemption, 15 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC.
435, 450-55 (1992) (discussing the Court's reluctance to find state tort laws preempted); Marc Z. Edell & Cynthia A. Walters, The Doctrine of Implied Preemption in
Products Liability Cases-Federalism in the Balance, 54 TENN. L. REV. 603, 607-13
(1987) (discussing the Court's protection of state tort laws from preemption).
18. 505 U.S. 504, 524 (1992).
19. See, e.g., CSX Transp., Inc. v. Easterwood, 113 S. Ct. 1732 (1993) (holding
that federally imposed speed limits on trains preempt excessive speed claims).
20. 464 U.S. 238 (1984).
21. 461 U.S. 190 (1983).
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Act 2 impliedly preempted all state safety regulation of nuclear
power plants.' Nonetheless, the majority in Silkwood held that
the plaintiffs claim for punitive damages was not preempted
under the Act.'
While employed at a Kerr-McGee plant, Karen Silkwood was
contaminated through exposure to pluonium.Y After she died
from unrelated causes, her father filed suit against the company
and, after a jury trial, was awarded $505,000 in actual damages
plus $10 million in punitive damages." The district court denied Kerr-McGee's posttrial motions, rejecting the company's
argument that its compliance with federal regulations precluded
an award of punitive damages. On appeal, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reversed the bulk of the
actual damages award because recovery for personal injuries
was governed exclusively by the workers' compensation system,
and the court also reversed the punitive damage award as preempted by federal law governing nuclear safety.'
The Supreme Court disagreed with the Tenth Circuit's preemption holding. Notwithstanding the Court's sweeping preemption decision the previous year in Pacific Gas, the majority in
Silkwood focused on the absence of any indication that Congress
intended to foreclose common-law tort actions for radiation exposure injuries: "This silence takes on added significance in light
of Congress' failure to provide any federal remedy for persons
injured by such conduct. It is difficult to believe that Congress

22. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2011-2296 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
23. See Pacific Gas, 461 U.S. at 212 ("[Tjhe Federal Government has occupied the
entire field of nuclear safety concerns, except the limited powers expressly ceded to

the States."). Nonetheless, the Court in Pacific Gas held that the challenged state
law was not preempted because it addressed financial, rather than safety, matters.

Id. at 207-08.
24. Silkwood, 464 U.S. at 248-58.
25. Id. at 241.
26. See id. at 241-45.
27. Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 485 F. Supp. 566, 585 (W.D. Okla. 1979) (noting that the company could not in fact demonstrate compliance with the applicable
regulation because the regulation imposed a duty to keep radiation releases "as low
as reasonably achievable"), rev'd, 667 F.2d 908 (10th Cir. 1981), rev'd, 464 U.S. 238

(1984).
28. Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 667 F.2d 908, 920, 923 (10th Cir. 1981), rev'd,
464 U.S. 238 (1984).
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would, without comment, remove all means of judicial recourse
for those injured by illegal conduct."29 The majority then noted
that the passage and subsequent amendment of the Price-Anderson Act,3" which limited the industry's liability in the event of a
nuclear accident, demonstrated that Congress assumed that tort
claims for radiation injuries remained viable.3 ' Although it recognized that common-law claims still might be foreclosed if they
created a conflict with federal standards or frustrated federal
objectives,32 the majority decided that Silkwood's punitive damage claim was not impliedly preempted as falling within the
field occupied by Congress."
Writing for the four dissenting members of the Court in
Silkwood, Justice Powell focused on the incongruity of allowing
a jury to assess what amounted to a $10 million fine against
29.
30.
tions
31.

Silkwood, 464 U.S. at 251.
Pub. L. No. 85-256, 71 Stat. 576 (1957) (codified as amended in scattered secof 42 U.S.C.).
See Silkwood, 464 U.S. at 251-56.
No doubt there is tension between the conclusion that safety regulation
is the exclusive concern of the federal law and the conclusion that a
State may nevertheless award damages based on its own law of liability.
But . . . Congress intended to stand by both concepts and to tolerate
whatever tension there was between them.
Id. at 256. In an earlier decision upholding the liability limitation of the Price-Anderson Act against constitutional challenge, the Court expressed its doubts "that the
Due Process Clause in fact requires that a legislatively enacted compensation scheme
either duplicate the recovery at common law or provide a reasonable substitute remedy." Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 88 (1978)
(finding that the Act, in any event, provided a reasonably just substitute for the
common-law remedies that it had replaced); see also Jenkins v. Amchem Prods., Inc.,
886 P.2d 869, 884-86 (Kan. 1994) (rejecting due process challenge to statute interpreted as preempting tort claims), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 80 (1995). But cf.
Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 673 (1977) ("Among the historic liberties so protected was a right to be free from, and to obtain judicial relief for, unjustified intrusions on personal security."); Richard B. Stewart & Cass R. Sunstein, Public Programs and Private Rights, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1193, 1310 n.479 (1982) (suggesting
that due process problems would result if common-law remedies are foreclosed without a substitute).
32. Silkwood, 464 U.S. at 256 ("We do not suggest that there could never be an
instance in which the federal law would pre-empt the recovery of damages based on
state law."). The Court, however, rejected the claim of the United States government, as amicus curiae, that the award of punitive damages conflicted with the federal remedial scheme, which was based on the imposition of civil fines for regulatory
infractions. Id. at 257.
33. Id.
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Kerr-McGee notwithstanding the company's compliance with
federal safety standards.' He also faulted the majority for its
departure from the broad preemption of nuclear safety matters
announced in Pacific Gas." Finally, Justice Powell suggested
that, for purposes of the preemption analysis, punitive damages
should be distinguished from compensatory damages,36 a point
emphasized by Justice Blackmun in a separate opinion:
[Tihe purpose of punitive damages is to regulate safety,
whereas the purpose of compensatory damages is to compensate victims. Because the Federal Government does not regulate the compensation of victims, and because it is inconceivable that Congress intended to leave victims with no remedy
at all, the pre-emption analysis established by Pacific Gas
comfortably accommodates-indeed it compels-the conclusion that compensatory damages are not preempted whereas
punitive damages are."
According to Justice Blackmun, the majority focused on the
wrong question-namely, whether federal law preempted compensatory damages claims-in resolving the very different issue
concerning preemption of punitive damages." As to the former

34. See id. at 283-84 (Powell, J., dissenting) ("This case is a disquieting example
of how the jury system can function as an unauthorized regulatory medium....
[Tihe Court attaches no importance to the fact that the AEC-the agency that
adopted the regulations and was responsible for their enforcement-investigated the
Silkwood incident and found no significant violation of its regulations.").
35. See id. at 279 (Powell, J., dissenting) ("The Court's decision today inexplicably
shifts this burden [of proving an exception to broad federal preemption] to allow
state law to prevail in the absence of a showing that Congress expressly had intended to pre-empt it."). Justice Powell discounted the relevance of the Price-Anderson
Act as evidence of Congress's belief that the Atomic Energy Act had not preempted
state common law. See id. at 279-80.
36. See id. at 275-76 & n.3, 282-83 (Powell, J., dissenting).
37. Id. at 263-64 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted); see also id. at 265
("It is incredible to suggest that Congress intended the Federal Government to have
the sole authority to set safety regulations, but left intact the authority of States to
require adherence to a different state standard through the imposition of jury
fines."). Justice Blackmun conceded that even an award of compensatory damages
would impact the operations of a nuclear facility, but he thought that this effect was
sufficiently indirect to avoid being preempted. Id. at 263.
38. See id. at 267 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("[Tihe Court's analysis never focuses
on the real issue; its entire analysis proceeds as if pre-emption of punitive damages
would require pre-emption of compensatory damages as well."); id. at 271 ("[Tlhe
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question, though not at issue in the case, all members of the
Court seemed to agree that sweeping federal preemption in the
field of nuclear safety would not cut off the availability of compensatory damages under state tort law.39
Six years later, in English v. General Electric Co.,40 the Supreme Court confirmed its hesitancy to find preemption of common-law claims. The Court unanimously held that federal occupation of the field of nuclear safety did not preempt a discharged
employee's state law claim for intentional infliction of emotional
distress.4 ' It decided that the effect of liability judgments on
safety decisions by operators of nuclear facilities was "neither
direct nor substantial enough to place petitioner's claim in the
pre-empted field."42 The Court acknowledged its heavy reliance
in Silkwood on the legislative history of the Price-Anderson Act,
and it conceded that this history offered no guidance on the
treatment of the employee's claim now before it." The other
factor deemed important by the majority in Silkwood-namely,
Congress's failure to provide a remedial substitute-was also absent because the whistleblower statute provided a federal remedy to discharged employees." Nonetheless, the Court in Eng-

Court's position rests on the notion that state tort law must be treated as an undif-

ferentiated body of law, and that all tort remedies have been left intact.").
39. Id. at 255, 263 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); id. at 275 (Powell, J., dissenting).
40. 496 U.S. 72 (1990).

41. See id. at 80-86. The Court also rejected General Electric's argument that the
federal statutory remedies for discharged whistleblowers impliedly preempted this
state law claim. See id. at 87-90.
42. Id. at 85; see also Farmer v. United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners, 430 U.S.
290, 305 (1977) (holding that the National Labor Relations Act did not preempt
intentional infliction of emotional distress claims).
43. English, 496 U.S. at 86 (explaining, however, that "it would be odd, if not
irrational, to conclude that Congress intended to include tort actions stemming from
retaliation against whistle-blowers in the preempted field but intended not to include
tort actions stemming from radiation damage suffered as a result of actual safety
violations"). Of course, there was no evidence of any "actual safety violations" in
Silkwood, at least not significant violations of any applicable safety standards.
44. The Court did not even acknowledge this seemingly important difference between the two cases, other than to reject General Electric's argument that the federal remedy provision would preempt of its own force. See id. at 87 ("Ordinarily, the
mere existence of a federal regulatory or enforcement scheme, even one as detailed
as § 210, does not by itself imply pre-emption of state remedies."); see also Goodyear
Atomic Corp. v. Miller, 486 U.S. 174, 186 n.9 (1988) (rejecting the claim that federal
regulation of nuclear safety preempted an award of additional workers' compensation
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lish embraced the assumption found in all three Silkwood opinions that compensatory damages claims survived the sweeping
federal regulation of the nuclear safety field.45
B. Cipollone and Its Progeny
Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc.," decided just two years after
English, signalled a dramatic break from the consensus against
the preemption of claims for compensatory damages apparent in
Silkwood and English. The question before the Court was
whether the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act
preempted common-law tort claims. Since 1965, Congress has
prescribed the warnings that must appear on the labels of cigarette packages.47 Section 5(b) of the Act, as amended in 1969,
provided that "[n]o requirement or prohibition based on smoking
and health shall be imposed under State law with respect to the
advertising or promotion of any cigarettes the packages of which
are labeled in conformity with the provisions of this chapter.""

benefits for violation of general state safety requirements, in part because a federal statute authorized application of state workers' compensation laws to federal
facilities).
45. English, 496 U.S. at 86.
46. 505 U.S. 504 (1992) (plurality opinion).
47. See Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act, Pub. L. No. 89-92, 79
Stat. 282 (1965) (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 1331-1341 (1994)). The 1965 Act
required that all cigarette packages bear the following statement: "Caution: Cigarette
Smoking May Be Hazardous to Your Health." Id. § 4. Within five years, the law
was amended to require a sterner precaution: "Warning: The Surgeon General Has
Determined That Cigarette Smoking Is Dangerous to Your Health." Public Health
Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-222, § 4, 84 Stat. 87, 88 (1970) (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 1331 (1994)). In 1984, the law was again substantially
amended, replacing the warning that had been used for over a decade with four
specific and even more forceful warnings that were to be used on a rotating basis.
See Comprehensive Smoking Education Act, Pub. L. No. 98-474, § 4, 98 Stat. 2200,
2201 (1984) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1331 (1994)).
48. 15 U.S.C. § 1334(b) (1994). By contrast, the 1965 version provided that "[n]o
statement relating to smoking and health" shall be required in the labeling or advertising of cigarettes labeled in conformity with the Act, 79 Stat. at 282, and the
Court held that this language did not preempt tort claims, Cipollone, 505 U.S. at
518-20 (explaining that an action for damages would never require a cigarette manufacturer to include any specific warning statement on the package). The Alcoholic
Beverage Labeling Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, tit. VIII, § 8001(a)(3), 102 Stat.
4518 (codified at 27 U.S.C. §§ 213-219 (1994)), which mandates a specific warning,
also includes a preemption provision, see 27 U.S.C. § 216 (1994) ("No statement
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Although a number of lower courts previously had found only
implied preemption of common-law claims under this provision,49 the Supreme Court in Cipollone viewed its task as limited to interpreting the scope of the statutory language: "Congress'
enactment of a provision defining the pre-emptive reach of a
statute implies that matters beyond that reach are not preempted."0 In a plurality decision on the issue, a majority of the
Justices agreed that the 1969 provision preempts products liability actions grounded on failure-to-warn (but not other) claims,
even though the statute did not explicitly delineate any such
claims as subject to preemption.51
Justice Stevens, writing for himself and three other Justices,
focused on the breadth of the statutory phrase "requirement or
prohibition," concluding that it "sweeps broadly and suggests no
relating to alcoholic beverages and health . . .shall be required under State law to
be placed on any container .

. . .").

Although not yet subject to judicial interpreta-

tion, the provision is quite similar to the 1965 cigarette statute and, therefore, probably will not offer any meaningful preemption defense against failure-to-warn claims.
49. See, e.g., Kotler v. American Tobacco Co., 926 F.2d 1217, 1222-24 (1st Cir.
1990), vacated, 505 U.S. 1215 (1992); Pennington v. Vistron Corp., 876 F.2d 414,
418-23 (5th Cir. 1989); Roysdon v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 849 F.2d 230, 234 (6th
Cir. 1988); Palmer v. Liggett Group, Inc., 825 F.2d 620, 625-26 (1st Cir. 1987); Stephen v. American Brands, Inc., 825 F.2d 312, 313 (11th Cir. 1987) (per curiam);
Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 789 F.2d 181, 187 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479
U.S. 1043 (1987); Forster v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 437 N.W.2d 655, 658-61
(Minn. 1989); cf. Dewey v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 577 A.2d 1239, 1247-51 (N.J.
1990) (finding neither express nor implied preemption of common-law claims).
50. Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 517 ("When Congress has considered the issue of preemption and has included in the enacted legislation a provision explicitly addressing
that issue, , . . 'there is no need to infer congressional intent to pre-empt . .

.

)

(quoting California Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272, 282 (1987)).
51. See id. at 518-30 (concluding that breach of express warranty and certain
fraudulent misrepresentation claims were not preempted). Justices Scalia and Thomas found an even broader preemptive effect in the statute and would have held all
common-law claims preempted under the 1969 amendment. See id. at 544-56 (Scalia,
J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part, joined by Thomas, J.).
Justices Blackmun, Kennedy, and Souter would have held none of the claims preempted. See id. at 531-44 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and dissenting in part, joined by Kennedy and Souter, JJ.). Because
the Court was fragmented on the preemptive force of the 1969 provision, "and no
single rationale explaining the result enjoy[ed] the assent of five Justices," Marks v.
United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977), the holding may be viewed as the position
taken by those concurring on the narrowest grounds, id.; see also Nichols v. United
States, 114 S.Ct. 1921, 1926 (1994) ("This test is more easily stated than applied to
the various opinions supporting the result in" a particular case.).
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distinction between positive enactments and common law; to the
contrary, those words easily encompass obligations that take the
form of common law rules." 2 Although he conceded that "Congress was primarily concerned with positive enactments by
States and localities," Justice Stevens believed that "the language of the Act plainly reaches beyond such enactments." 53 He

added, however, that section 5(b) does not preempt all commonlaw claims, only those predicated on a legal duty that constitutes a "requirement or prohibition" of the sort contemplated by
that provision, as narrowly construed by the Court in light of
the strong presumption against preemption.54
Justice Stevens proceeded to evaluate each of the plaintiff's
claims to determine whether it was preempted. First, and not
surprisingly, he found preemption of the failure-to-warn
claim.55 Second, in contrast, the plaintiff's express warranty
claim was not preempted because the imposition of liability
52. Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 522 ("[Clommon law damages actions of the sort raised
by petitioner are premised on the existence of a legal duty and it is difficult to say
that such actions do not impose 'requirements or prohibitions.'"); see also International Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481, 495 (1987) (holding that Clean Water Act
preempted common-law nuisance suits against polluters in different states because of
the potential regulatory effect of monetary or injunctive relief); San Diego Bldg.
Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 247 (1959) (noting that an award of damages under state law can exert a regulatory effect).
53. Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 522 (adding that "it is the essence of the common law
to enforce duties that are either affirmative requirements or negative prohibitions").
Although Congress did not explicitly reference common-law claims in the preemption
provision, as it had done in other statutes, Justice Stevens pointed out that Congress also had not included a savings clause for such claims, as it has done in other
statutes. Id. at 523 n.22. But cf. Bethlehem Steel Co. v. New York State Labor
Relations Bd., 330 U.S. 767, 780 (1947) ("Congress can speak with drastic clarity
whenever it chooses to assure full federal authority, completely displacing the
States.").
54. Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 523-24. Justice Stevens noted, for instance, that section
5(b) would not preempt tort claims alleging defects in manufacturing or product
design. Id. at 523.
55. Id. at 524.
Thus, insofar as claims under either failure to warn theory require a
showing that respondents' post-1969 advertising or promotions should
have included additional, or more clearly stated, warnings, those claims
are pre-empted. The Act does not, however, pre-empt petitioner's claims
that rely solely on respondents' testing or research practices or other
actions unrelated to advertising or promotion.
Id. at 524-25.
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would arise from the breach of "a contractual commitment voluntarily undertaken" by the warrantor rather than from a violation of any requirement imposed under state law.5" Third, Justice Stevens subdivided the plaintiffs fraudulent misrepresentation claim into two distinct theories: one alleging that the
companies' advertising neutralized the effect of the warnings
mandated by Congress, a claim that was preempted just as was
the failure-to-warn claim,5 7 and one alleging violations of a
more general duty not to conceal material facts, a claim that
was not preempted "insofar as those claims rely on a state law
duty to disclose such facts through channels of communication
other than advertising or promotion."5 8 For example, section
5(b) would not foreclose recovery on a fraud claim alleging a
failure "to disclose material facts about smoking and health to
an administrative agency" if state law created a duty to disclose
such information.5 9
Justice Blackmun, joined by Justices Kennedy and Souter,
dissented from the Court's holding that some tort claims were
preempted. At the outset of his opinion, Justice Blackmun emphasized the traditional presumption against preemption:
The principles of federalism and respect for state sovereignty
that underlie the Court's reluctance to find pre-emption
56. Id. at 525-27. "[A] contractual requirement, although only enforceable under
state law, is not 'imposed' by the state, but rather is 'imposed' by the contracting
party upon itself." Id. at 526 n.24; see also American Airlines, Inc. v. Wolens, 115 S.
Ct. 817, 824-26 (1995) (holding that Airline Deregulation Act did not preempt breach
of contract claims involving frequent flyer program).
57. Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 527-28.
Such a claim is predicated on a state-law prohibition against statements
in advertising and promotional materials that tend to minimize the
health hazards associated with smoking ....

In this light it seems quite

clear that petitioner's first theory of fraudulent misrepresentation is inextricably related to petitioner's first failure to warn theory, a theory that
we have already concluded is largely pre-empted by § 5(b).
Id.
58. Id. at 528. "State law prohibitions on false statements of material fact do not
create 'diverse, nonuniform, and confusing' standards. Unlike state law obligations
concerning the warning necessary to render a product 'reasonably safe,' state law
proscriptions on intentional fraud rely only on a single, uniform standard: falsity."
Id. at 529. Similarly, Justice Stevens took the position that the plaintiff's claim of a
conspiracy to commit such fraud was not preempted. Id. at 530.
59. Id. at 528.
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where Congress has not spoken directly to the issue apply
with equal force where Congress has spoken, though ambiguously. In such cases, the question is not whether Congress
intended to pre-empt state regulation, but to what extent. We
do not, absent unambiguous evidence, infer a scope of preemption beyond that which clearly is mandated by Congress'
language."

Given this reluctance, Justice Blackmun found Justice Stevens's
reading of the preemption provision at issue in the case "little
short of baffling," noting that the phrase "requirement or prohibition" is "far from unambiguous and cannot be said clearly to
evidence a congressional mandate to pre-empt state common-law
damages actions.""' Citing English, 2 he also disagreed with
Justice Stevens's premise that tort liability would exert the
same sort of regulatory effect on companies as state statutes or
regulations."a
More importantly, Justice Blackmun found it implausible that
Congress intended to deprive injured persons of a compensatory
mechanism: "Unlike the Court, I am unwilling to believe that

60. Id. at 533 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in
part, and dissenting in part) (footnote omitted).
61. Id. at 534-35 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in
part, and dissenting in part). Justice Blackmun observed that, in comparable circumstances, Congress has expressed its intention not to affect tort liability. Id. at 537
n.2; see also 15 U.S.C. § 4406(b)-(c) (1994) (The Comprehensive Smokeless Tobacco
Health Education Act preempts only state statutes or regulations, and "[n]othing in
this chapter shall relieve any person from liability at common law or under State
statutory law to any other person."). This point, however, can cut two ways. See
Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 523 n.22 ("Congress . . .was simply pre-empting particular
common law claims, while saving others."); Gade v. National Solid Wastes Management Ass'n, 505 U.S. 88, 100-01 (1992) (plurality opinion).
62. English v. General Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72 (1990).
63. Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 536-38 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part, concurring in
the judgment in part, and dissenting in part). "The level of choice that a defendant
retains in shaping its own behavior [in response to the imposition of tort liability]
distinguishes the indirect regulatory effect of the common law from positive enactments such as statutes and administrative regulations." Id. at 536-37. Whether a
manufacturer would have appreciably fewer options in selecting a response to a
particular state statute remains unclear. For instance, just as they might be willing
to absorb tort judgments rather than alter their products or conduct, companies
might choose to pay fines for noncompliance with state statutes or regulations as a
cost of doing business in that state. Thus, it is not obvious that state common law
has any less of a direct regulatory effect than state positive law.
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Congress, without any mention of state common-law damages
actions or of its intention dramatically to expand the scope of
federal pre-emption, would have eliminated the only means of
judicial recourse for those injured by cigarette manufacturers'
unlawful conduct."' He noted that, in other statutes, Congress
had established alternative remedies to substitute for preempted
common-law claims.6 5 Indeed, most of the earlier preemption
decisions involving tort claims had arisen in labor cases, and the
Court repeatedly had held that the National Labor Relations
Board (NLRB) enjoyed primary or exclusive jurisdiction in the
field of labor-management relations and that the federal remedial scheme foreclosed actions under state law.66 In contrast,

64. Id. at 542 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in
part, and dissenting in part). Of course, the plurality did not decide that all claims
for relief were preempted but only those premised on a failure to warn. Justice
Blackmun took issue, however, with Justice Stevens's varied treatment of different
types of tort claims: "I can perceive no principled basis for many of the Court's
asserted distinctions among the common-law claims, and I cannot believe that Congress intended to create such a hodge-podge of allowed and disallowed claims ..
Id. at 543.
65. Id. at 541 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in
part, and dissenting in part) (citing the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of
1974 (ERISA)); see also Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 47-48 (1987)
(holding that common-law tort and contract claims for the failure of an employee
plan to pay benefits were preempted by ERISA); Offshore Logistics, Inc. v.
Tallentire, 477 U.S. 207, 232-33 (1986) (holding that wrongful death action was preempted by Death on the High Seas Act); Chicago & N.W. Transp. Co. v. Kalo Brick
& Tile Co., 450 U.S. 311, 331 (1981) (holding that the Interstate Commerce Act preempted a state common-law action for damages against a regulated carrier that
abandoned a railroad line, noting that the Act provided the shipper with remedies).
Although technically not a matter of preemption, the displacement of remedies under
federal common law by statute also has depended, in some cases, on the availability
of substitute remedies. See County of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation, 470 U.S. 226,
236-39 (1985) (rejecting displacement of federal common-law right by statute lacking
remedies); City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 316-17, 326 (1981) (finding
displacement by Clean Water Act); see also Robert L. Glicksman, Federal Preemption
and Private Legal Remedies for Pollution, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 121, 152-71 (1985)
(discussing the statutory "preemption" of environmental nuisance claims previously
brought under federal common law).
66. See, e.g., Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 218-19 (1985); Brown v.
Hotel & Restaurant Employees Int'l Union, 468 U.S. 491, 502 (1984) (announcing
presumption in favor of preemption); Local 926, Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs v.
Jones, 460 U.S. 669, 675-80 (1983); San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359
U.S. 236, 245-47 (1959). But see United Constr. Workers v. Laburnum Constr. Co.,
347 U.S. 656, 663-64 (1954) ("Here Congress has neither provided nor suggested any
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the Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act provides no alternative remedies,6 7 and it delegates to the Federal Trade Commission only limited enforcement powers."
Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Thomas, went to the other
extreme, dissenting from the Court's holding that some commonlaw claims were not preempted.6 9 At the outset of his opinion,
Justice Scalia chided the other members of the Court for suggesting a special rule of narrow construction for statutory preemption provisions, though he found some comfort in the fact
that Justice Stevens evidently proceeded to ignore this rule in
order to find preemption of some common-law claims in this
case.70 Applying ordinary principles of statutory construction,
Justice Scalia concluded that all of the plaintiffs tort claims
were preempted under section 5(b), including breach of express
warranty and fraudulent misrepresentation.' "The test for preemption in this setting should be one of practical compulsion,
i.e., whether the [common] law practically compels the manufacturers to engage in behavior that Congress has barred the
States from prescribing directly."72
substitute for the traditional state court procedure for collecting damages for injuries
caused by tortious conduct. For us to cut off the injured respondent from this right
of recovery will .

. . ,

in effect, grant petitioners immunity from liability for their

tortious conduct. We see no substantial reason for reaching such a result."). See
generally David L. Gregory, The Labor Preemption Doctrine: Hamiltonian Renaissance
or Last Hurrah?, 27 WM. & MARY L. REV. 507 (1986) (discussing federal preemption
in the labor area); Stephanie R. Marcus, Note, The Need for a New Approach to
Federal Preemption of Union Members' State Law Claims, 99 YALE L.J. 209, 212-14
(1989) (criticizing federal preemption of state labor law).
67. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1334 (1994).
68. Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 541-42 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part, concurring in
the judgment in part, and dissenting in part).
69. Id. at 544 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in
part).
70. Id. (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part)
("[Our job is to interpret Congress's decrees of pre-emption neither narrowly nor
broadly, but in accordance with their apparent meaning."). Justice Scalia also disagreed with the Court's suggestion that express preemption would eliminate the
possibility of finding any implied preemption. Id. at 546-47.
71. See id. at 548-54 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting
in part). Justice Scalia conceded, however, that "the hypothetical law requiring disclosure to a state regulatory agency would seem to survive" a preemption defense.
Id. at 555. He also would have found preemption only of failure-to-warn claims under the 1965 provision. Id. at 549-50.
72. Id. at 555 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in
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Complaining that Justice Stevens had employed different
levels of generality to distinguish among various claims for
recovery,7 3 Justice Scalia feared that the Court's judgment
would pose serious interpretive difficulties for the lower
courts, 4 a concern echoed by Justice Blackmun.7" Although
preemption decisions involving tort claims against cigarette
manufacturers have abated for the moment,7 6 the courts have
struggled to make sense of Cipollone in other contexts.77
In CSX Transportation,Inc. v. Easterwood,78 a case decided
during the following Term, a clear majority of the Court accepted the basic premise of the plurality's decision in Cipollone,
namely, that a statutory preemption provision could preempt
tort claims "expressly" even if not specifically enumerated by
Congress.79 The Federal Railroad Safety Act of 1970 (FRSA)0

part).
73. See id. at 552-54 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting
in part).
74. Id. at 556 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in
part) ("These and other questions raised by today's decision will fill the law-books
for years to come. A disposition that raises more questions than it answers does not
serve the country well.").
75. Id. at 543-44 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in
part, and dissenting in part) (I can only speculate as to the difficulty lower courts
will encounter in attempting to implement the Court's decision."); see also Jeffrey R.
Stern, Note, Preemption Doctrine and the Failure of Textualism in Cipollone v.
Liggett Group, 80 VA. L. REV. 979, 1002-08 (1994) (criticizing the text-controlled
interpretive methodologies underlying all three of the opinions in Cipollone). A further analysis of the Court's decision appears in part IV.B.2.
76. Only a few decisions have been reported since Cipollone. See, e.g., Castano v.
American Tobacco Co., 870 F. Supp. 1425, 1432-34 (E.D. La. 1994) (rejecting preemption defense against fraud and deceit, negligent misrepresentation, intentional infliction of emotional distress, violation of consumer protection statutes, breach of express and implied warranties, negligent manufacturing and design, and strict liability claims); Grinnell v. American Tobacco Co., 883 S.W.2d 791, 797-98 (Tex. App.
1994) (same); Mangini v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 875 P.2d 73, 80-83 (Cal.) (holding that claim for violation of state consumer protection statute was not preempted),
cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 577 (1994); cf. Vango Media, Inc. v. City of New York, 34
F.3d 68, 74 (2d Cir. 1994) (holding that city ordinance mandating certain warnings
in advertisements was preempted).
77. See discussion infra part III.A; Stern, supra note 75, at 1012-13.
78. 113 S. Ct. 1732 (1993).
79. Id. at 1737.
80. Pub. L. No. 91-458, 84 Stat. 971 (1970) (codified as amended at 49 U.S.C.A.
§§ 20101-20153 (West 1995)).
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calls for national uniformity in "laws, rules, regulations, orders,
and standards relating to railroad safety."8 Citing Cipollone,
the Court observed that the "duties imposed on railroads by the
common law fall within the scope of these broad phrases."82
The Easterwood litigation arose from a collision between a
CSX train and a truck driven by the plaintiffs husband. In her
wrongful death action, the plaintiff alleged that CSX was negligent in two respects: failing to maintain adequate warning devices at the railroad crossing and operating its train at an excessive speed.' The district court granted the defendant's motion
for summary judgment as to both claims, but the United States
Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit decided that only the
excessive speed claim was preempted." The Supreme Court
affirmed, agreeing that the grade crossing negligence claim was
not preempted because no federal regulation governed the use of
warning devices at this particular crossing.' Although it con-

81. 49 U.S.C.A. § 20106 (West 1995). The substantially identical earlier version of
the provision that was before the Court in Easterwood provided as follows:
The Congress declares that laws, rules, regulations, orders, and standards
relating to railroad safety shall be nationally uniform to the extent practicable. A State may adopt or continue in force any law, rule, regulation,
order, or standard relating to railroad safety until such time as the Secretary has adopted a rule, regulation, order, or standard covering the
subject matter of such State requirement. A State may adopt or continue
in force an additional or more stringent law, rule, regulation, order, or
standard relating to railroad safety when necessary to eliminate or reduce an essentially local safety hazard, and when not incompatible with
any Federal law, rule, regulation, order, or standard, and when not creating an undue burden on interstate commerce.
45 U.S.C. § 434 (1988).
82. Easterwood, 113 S. Ct. at 1737. In the immediately preceding paragraph of its
opinion, the Court reiterated its oft-stated reluctance to find federal preemption of "a
subject traditionally governed by state law." Id. Later it observed that § 434 "displays considerable solicitude for state law in that its express pre-emption clause is
both prefaced and succeeded by express saving clauses." Id. at 1738.
83. Id. at 1736.
84. See Easterwood v. CSX Transp., Inc., 742 F. Supp. 676, 678 (N.D. Ga. 1990),
affd in part and rev'd in part, 933 F.2d 1548, 1553-56 (11th Cir. 1991), affd, 113 S.
Ct. 1732 (1993).
85. Focusing on the word "covering" in § 434, Easterwood, 113 S. Ct. at 1738, the
Court found that none of the federal regulations cited by CSX covered the safety of
grade crossings of the type where this accident occurred. Id. at 1742. First, the
Court discounted the force of regulations requiring that states work to improve
traffic safety as a condition for receiving federal highway funds. Id. at 1739 ("In
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ceded that Department of Transportation (DOT) regulations governed the selection and installation of warning devices at certain
grade crossings and that these would preempt common-law tort
claims where applicable, the Court found that the regulations
did not apply to the particular crossing in question.8 6
The Court did, however, hold that the plaintiff's negligence
claim premised on excessive speed was preempted. 7 DOT regulations establish maximum operating speeds for freight and
passenger trains for each class of railroad track." The plaintiff
conceded that CSX's train was traveling at less than sixty miles
per hour, the maximum permitted for a class four track, but she
nonetheless argued that CSX breached a common-law duty to
operate its train at a safe speed.89 Although the Court recognized that the regulation only purported to set a ceiling on train
speeds, it found that these speeds were established to account
for safety concerns and, therefore, precluded additional state
regulation on the subject. The Court also rejected Ms.

fact, the scheme of negligence liability could just as easily complement these regulations by encouraging railroads . . . to provide current and complete information to
the state agency responsible for determining priorities for improvement projects.").
Second, the Court declined to give preemptive effect to the government's Manual on
Uniform Traffic Control Devices because that document disavowed any such intent.
Id. at 1740.
86. See id. at 1740-42. The Court hinted, however, that the decisions by state and
local officials not to install warning devices at the crossing might still be relevant in
assessing the reasonableness of CSXs conduct. See id. at 1742 n.12 ("Of course we
express no opinion on how the state-law suit against the railroad should come out
in light of the decisions taken by Cartersville and the Georgia DOT with respect to
the Cook Street project."). DOT subsequently proposed to trigger broad preemption of
grade-crossing tort claims. See 60 Fed. Reg. 11,649, 11,651 (1995) (to be codified at
49 C.F.R. pt. 234) (proposed Mar. 2, 1995).
87. Easterwood, 113 S. Ct. at 1742.
88. 49 C.F.R. § 213.9(a) (1994).
89. Easterwood, 113 S. Ct. at 1742.
90. Id. The Court rejected the argument that the maximum speed regulation
sought only to minimize the risk of derailments rather than to improve the safety of
grade crossings. Id. at 1743. Two Justices disagreed with the majority on this point
and would have held that the Act did not preempt the plaintiffs excessive speed
claim. See id. at 1744-45 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part,
joined by Souter, J.). Even the dissenters, however, admitted that federal regulations
could preempt common-law claims if they intended to cover the subject of gradecrossing safety. Id. at 1745 ("Had the Secretary wished to pre-empt all state laws
governing train speed, he could have more explicitly defined the regulatory 'subject
matter' to be 'cover[ed].').
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Easterwood's effort to invoke the statute's savings clause to
avoid preemption of her excessive speed claim."'
Most recently, in FreightlinerCorp. v. Myrick, 2 a unanimous
Court held that the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety
Act of 1966 (NTMVSA)" did not preempt certain design defect
claims against manufacturers of eighteen wheel tractor-trailers. 4 Ben Myrick suffered severe, permanent injuries when his
vehicle collided with a truck that had jackknifed into on-coming
traffic, and he sued the truck's manufacturer for its failure to install an antilock braking system (ABS).95 The district court
granted the manufacturer's motion for summary judgment based
on federal preemption, but the United States Court of Appeals
for the Eleventh Circuit reversed." The Supreme Court affirmed, rejecting both express and implied preemption arguments because there was no federal requirement then in effect
governing the brakes used on trucks. 7

91. See id. at 1743 ("The state law on which respondent relies is concerned with
local hazards only in the sense that its application turns on the facts of each case.
The common law of negligence provides a general rule to address all hazards caused
by lack of due care, not just those owing to unique local conditions.").
92. 115 S. Ct. 1483 (1995).
93. Pub. L. No. 89-563, tit. I, 80 Stat. 718 (formerly codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. §§ 1381-1431) (1988)). The relevant sections provide as follows:
(b) Preemption.-(1) When a motor vehicle safety standard is in effect
under this chapter, a State or political subdivision of a State may prescribe or continue in effect a standard applicable to the same aspect of
performance of a motor vehicle or motor vehicle equipment only if the
standard is identical to the standard prescribed under this chapter ...
(e) Common law liability.-Compliance with a motor vehicle safety standard prescribed under this chapter does not exempt a person from liability at common law.
49 U.S.C.A. § 30103 (West 1995) (formerly codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1392(d), 1397(k)
(1988)).
94. See Freightliner,115 S. Ct. at 1487-88. Justice Scalia concurred in the judgment, but without comment. Id. at 1488 (Scalia, J. concurring).
95. Id. at 1485.
96. See Myrick v. Fruehauf Corp., 795 F. Supp. 1139, 1142-43 (N.D. Ga. 1992),
rev'd, 13 F.3d 1516, 1521-28 (11th Cir. 1994), affd sub nom. Freightliner Corp. v.
Myrick, 115 S. Ct. 1438 (1995).
97. Freightliner, 115 S. Ct. at 1487-88. DOT had promulgated a regulation that
would have required antilock brakes on trucks, but it suspended the operation of
this rule after a successful judicial challenge by the industry. Id. at 1486. The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) had not undertaken new
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Because it found no federal safety standard that would trigger
the statute's preemption provision, the Court in Freightlinerdid
not reach Myrick's separate argument that tort claims would
never be preempted by the NTMVSA, either because the term
"standard" in the preemption provision did not include commonlaw claims or because the savings clause explicitly preserved
"any liability under common law." 8 Nonetheless, it also considered the possibility that such claims might be impliedly preempted even if not within the express terms of the statute. The
Court explained that Cipollone did not "announc[e] a categorical
rule precluding the coexistence of express and implied pre-emption"; rather, it meant only that an express preemption provision
"supports a reasonable inference" that "Congress did not intend
to pre-empt other matters."9 9 Ultimately, the Court in
Freightlinerrejected the implied preemption arguments for the
same reason that the express preemption defense failed, namely,
the absence of any federal requirement with which a commonlaw tort judgment might conflict. 0 0 Even so, by considering implied preemption arguments in a case in which Congress had

rulemaking on this issue, but the Court refused to find preemption premised on a
conscious decision by the Agency that no regulation was necessary. Id. at 1487.
98. Id. at 1487 n.3. Even so, a few weeks after issuing its opinion in Freightliner,
the Court vacated and remanded for further consideration a decision that had rejected a preemption defense on these grounds. See Hernandez-Gomez v. Leonardo, 884
P.2d 183, 190-91 (Ariz. 1994) (denying preemption even though defendant had complied with the applicable NHTSA standard), vacated sub nom. Volkswagen of Am.,
Inc. v. Hernandez-Gomez, 115 S. Ct. 1819 (1995). Although it is hazardous to read
anything into such a disposition, see Henry v. City of Rock Hill, 376 U.S. 776, 777
(1964), the decision to vacate and remand the case for further consideration suggests
that the Court might support preemption under the NTMVSA in cases in which
federal rules apply, see generally Arthur D. Hellman, The Supreme Court's Second
Thoughts: Remands for Reconsideration and Denials of Review in Cases Held for
Plenary Decisions, 11 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 5, 17 (1983) (finding that "a reconsideration order, if not tantamount to reversal, does indicate a strong leaning in that
direction," but adding that lower courts frequently adhere to their original judgments). The remand, however, may reflect only a direction to reconsider the possibility of implied preemption, something that the Arizona court had refused to do on
the strength of Cipollone. See Hernandez-Gomez, 884 P.2d at 188-89 & n.13.
99. Freightliner,115 S. Ct. at 1488.
100. Id. ("First, it is not impossible for petitioners to comply with both federal and
state law because there is simply no federal standard for a private party to comply
with. . . . [Second, a] finding of liability against petitioners would undermine no
federal objectives or purposes with respect to ABS devices, since none exist.").
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spoken to the issue, the Court weakened the one aspect of its
decision in Cipollone that appeared to make the test for preemption of tort claims somewhat more stringent than it had been
under prior decisions. 1°
Taken together, the Supreme Court's most recent preemption
decisions stand in sharp contrast to its clear reluctance in
Silkwood and English to find tort claims foreclosed by federal
law. Nor can these disparate decisions be reconciled by noting
that the earlier cases involved only implied preemption, while
Cipollone and its progeny arose under explicit statutory preemption provisions. The provisions in the latter cases made no mention of tort claims, and the Court in Freightlinerentertained
both express and implied preemption arguments. At the most
fundamental level, therefore, Cipollone can be understood as a
repudiation of the consensus evident in Silkwood and English
that tort claims did not have a sufficiently direct regulatory
effect to fall prey to a federal preemption defense. As evidenced
by Easterwood and Freightliner,however, in each case courts
must still decide whether federal requirements apply to trigger
preemption and which types of claims are then foreclosed. This
task will, of course, vary under different statutory provisions.
III. CoMPLIcATIoNS IN APPLYING THE DEFENSE
More than three years have elapsed since Cipollone was decided. As feared by a number of the Justices in that case, the lower
courts have struggled to apply the plurality's judgment in other
contexts.' 2 Preemption provisions appear in statutes regulating, inter alia, medical devices, pesticides and other hazardous
chemicals, and various modes of transportation. Because these
provisions express congressional intent in different terms and, in
some cases, are accompanied by savings clauses of varying

101. See John A. Chatowski, Note, Cipollone and the Clear Statement Rule: Doctrinal Anomaly or New Development in Federal Preemption?, 44 SYRACUSE L. REV. 769,
796 (1992); Stern, supra note 75, at 1008-12.
102. See Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 543-44 (1992) (Blackmun,
J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and dissenting in part) ("I
can only speculate as to the difficulty lower courts will encounter in attempting to
implement the Court's decision."); id. at 555-56 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
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breadth, courts have encountered difficulties when interpreting
the proper scope of federal preemption. A number of lower courts
have read Cipollone quite expansively, finding preemption of
most or all tort claims, sometimes even in cases in which the
defendants have not complied with the applicable federal safety
requirements.
A. Express Preemption Provisions in Federal Safety Statutes
This section provides a brief summary of recent lower court
decisions applying express preemption provisions in the context
of tort litigation as a foundation for exploring certain recurring
questions in the sections that follow. Companies have raised the
preemption defense in recent litigation involving medical devices, pesticides, hazardous substances, automobiles, boats, railroads, and airlines. Although the courts in these cases are interpreting the language of different statutes, several common issues arise.
1. Medical Devices
Both before and after Cipollone, express preemption as a defense to tort liability has arisen most frequently in products
liability litigation against manufacturers of medical devices.
Unlike most other industries subject to regulation by the FDA,
medical device manufacturers benefit from a statutory provision
expressly preempting nonidentical state requirements. 3 Al-

103. The applicable section states:
Except as provided in subsection (b) [which allows States to petition the
agency for an exemption], no State or political subdivision of a State may
establish or continue in effect with respect to a device intended for human use any requirement(1) which is different from, or in addition to, any requirement applicable under this chapter to the device, and
(2) which relates to the safety or effectiveness of the device or to
any other matter included in a requirement applicable to the device under this chapter.
21 U.S.C. § 360k(2) (1994). This provision was part of the Medical Device Amendments (MDA). Pub. L. No. 94-295, § 2, 90 Stat. 540, 574 (1976) (amending the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act (FDCA), 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-394 (1994)). A limited
class of FDA food labeling requirements also expressly preempt state law. 21 U.S.C.
§ 343-1(a) (1994).
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most without exception, the lower courts have held that this
provision preempts tort claims to the extent that the FDA regulates a particular medical device.'0 4
For instance, courts have dismissed claims against tampon
manufacturers for failure to warn of toxic shock syndrome because the FDA imposes specific warning requirements for these
products. 5 More recent preemption decisions involving medical devices are even more sweeping, holding that premarket
approval by the FDA defeats a variety of common-law claims,
including those alleging defective design, testing, manufacture,

or labeling.'
Courts have been only slightly more hesitant to find preemption of tort claims against manufacturers of devices distributed
without full premarket approval, such as those being used in

104. See Lars Noah, Amplification of Federal Preemption in Medical Device Cases,
49 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 183, 199-200 (1994). A number of courts have found that no
claims are preempted because a particular device is not regulated by the FDA. See,
e.g., Anguiano v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 44 F.3d 806, 810 (9th Cir. 1995);
Oliver v. Johnson & Johnson, Inc., 863 F. Supp. 251, 253-55 (W.D. Pa. 1994). Only
a few have held that tort claims are never preempted. See Mulligan v. Pfizer, Inc.,
850 F. Supp. 633, 636 (S.D. Ohio 1994); Haudrich v. Howmedica, Inc., 642 N.E.2d
206, 215 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994), aff'd, No. 78319, 1996 M1l.LEXIS 8 (Ill. Jan. 18, 1996);
see also Robert S. Adler & Richard A. Mann, Preemption and Medical Devices: The
Courts Run Amok, 59 MO. L. REV. 895, 916-42 (1994) (criticizing trend toward finding express preemption of common-law claims).
105. See Moore v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 867 F.2d 243, 246-47 (5th Cir. 1989);
Sloman v. Tambrands, Inc., 841 F. Supp. 699, 701 n.2 (D. Md. 1993) (listing cases).
Under the regulation, every tampon package must, at a minimum, include the following statement: "ATTENTION: Tampons are associated with Toxic Shock Syndrome
(TSS). TSS is a rare but serious disease that may cause death. Read and save the
enclosed information." 21 C.F.R. § 801.430(c),(e) (1995). The accompanying package
insert must include a number of detailed statements describing the precise risks of
TSS and instructions for minimizing those risks. Id. § 801.430(d).
106. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Collagen Corp., 67 F.3d 1268, 1280-81 (7th Cir. 1995)
(injectable collagen), petition for cert. filed, 64 U.S.L.W. 3593 (U.S. Feb. 20, 1996)
(No. 95-1323); Michael v. Shiley, Inc., 46 F.3d 1316, 1324-31 (3d Cir.) (artificial
heart valve), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 67 (1995); Martello v. Ciba Vision Corp., 42
F.3d 1167, 1169 (8th Cir. 1994) (contact lens disinfectant system), cert. denied, 115
S. Ct. 2614 (1995); King v. Collagen Corp., 983 F.2d 1130, 1133-36 (1st Cir.) (injectable collagen), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 84 (1993); Stamps v. Collagen Corp., 984 F.2d
1416, 1421-25 (5th Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 86 (1993). But see Kennedy
v. Collagen Corp., 67 F.3d 1453, 1458-59 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding that the MDA never preempts tort claims, acknowledging but rejecting the consensus position of the
other circuits).
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clinical trials pursuant to the FDA's investigational device exemption'0 7 or devices cleared for marketing as substantially
equivalent to an existing product."0 8 Although no court has
suggested that federal law preempts all tort claims against all
devices, courts have reached a consensus that such claims are
preempted to the extent that the FDA regulates a particular
device, whether through published regulations or through the
individualized review and approval of an application to market a
medical device.
2. Pesticidesand Other Hazardous Chemicals
The Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act
(FIFRA), enacted in 1947, governs the registration and labeling
of pesticides.0 9 The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
currently implements these requirements.' 0 FIFRA includes a

107. See, e.g., Martin v. Telectronics Pacing Sys., Inc., 70 F.3d 39, 41-42 (6th Cir.
1995) (pacemaker), petition for cert. filed, 64 U.S.L.W. 3593 (U.S. Feb. 20, 1996) (No.
95-1336); Becker v. Optical Radiation Corp., 66 F.3d 18, 20-21 (2d Cir. 1995) (intraocular lenses); Gile v. Optical Radiation Corp., 22 F.3d 540, 541-42 (3d Cir.)
(same), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 429 (1994); Duncan v. IOLAB Corp., 12 F.3d 194
(11th Cir. 1994) (per curiam) (same); Slater v. Optical Radiation Corp., 961 F.2d
1330, 1333 (7th Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 500 U.S. 917 (1992); Hunsaker v. Surgidev
Corp., 818 F. Supp. 744, 753 (M.D. Pa. 1992) (same), affd mem., 5 F.3d 1489 (3d
Cir. 1993).
108. See, e.g., English v. Mentor Corp., 67 F.3d 477, 481-83 (3d Cir. 1995) (penile
prosthesis), petition for cert. filed, 133 L. Ed. 2d 594 (1995); Duval v. Bristol-Myers
Squibb Co., 65 F.3d 392, 398-401 (4th Cir. 1995) (same), petition for cert. filed, 64
U.S.L.W. 3439 (U.S. Dec. 22, 1995) (No. 95-1010); Reeves v. AcroMed Corp., 44 F.3d
300, 305-07 (5th Cir.) (metal bone implant), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 2251 (1995);
Mendes v. Medtronic, Inc., 18 F.3d 13, 17-19 (1st Cir. 1994) (pacemaker); National
Bank of Commerce v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 38 F.3d 988, 998-99 (8th Cir. 1994)
(Loken, J., concurring) (tampon); cf. Feldt v. Mentor Corp., 61 F.3d 431, 436-38 (5th
Cir. 1995) (holding that premarket clearance would preempt warning and manufacturing but not design defect claims), petition for cert. filed, 133 L. Ed. 2d 594 (1995).
But see LaMontagne v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 834 F. Supp. 576, 583-85
(D. Conn. 1993) (temporomandibular joint implant), affd, 41 F.3d 846, 855 (2d Cir.
1994); Ginochio v. Surgikos, Inc., 864 F. Supp. 948, 954-56 (N.D. Cal. 1994) (artificial knee implants); Oja v. Howmedica, Inc., 848 F. Supp. 905, 907 (D. Colo. 1994)
(hip replacement device); Larsen v. Pacesetter Sys., Inc., 837 P.2d 1273, 1282 (Haw.
1992) (pacemaker).
109. Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act, ch. 125, 61 Stat. 163
(1947) (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. §§ 136-136w-2 (1994)); see also Ruckelshaus
v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 991-97 (1984) (summarizing history of legislation).
110. 7 U.S.C. § 136(b) (1994).
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provision preempting nonidentical state labeling and packaging
requirements, but the preemption provision is coupled with a
limited savings clause expressly permitting state regulation of
the sale and use of pesticides."'
The lower courts remain divided about whether this provision
of the statute preempts common-law tort claims against pesticide manufacturers, especially failure-to-warn claims. Before
Cipollone, many courts declined to find either express or implied
preemption of tort claims against pesticide manufacturers,"'
although several others found implied preemption of failure-towarn claims."' In the wake of Cipollone, however, most courts

111. The section states:
(a) In general A State may regulate the sale or use of any federally
registered pesticide or device in the State, but only if and to the extent
the regulation does not permit any sale or use prohibited by this subchapter.
(b) Uniformity Such State shall not impose or continue in effect any requirements for labeling or packaging in addition to or different from
those required under this subchapter.
Id. § 136v. The Supreme Court interpreted this savings clause in Wisconsin Public
Intervenor v. Mortier, 501 U.S. 597, 606-16 (1991). See Chemical Specialties Mfrs.
Ass'n v. Allenby, 958 F.2d 941, 947-48 (9th Cir.) (holding that FIFRA does not preempt California's carcinogen warning requirements), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 80
(1992); New York State Pesticide Coalition, Inc. v. Jorling, 874 F.2d 115, 119 (2d
Cir. 1989) (holding that FIFRA does not preempt state regulation requiring notice of
pesticide application by posting signs).
112. See, e.g., Ferebee v. Chevron Chem. Co., 736 F.2d 1529, 1539-43 (D.C. Cir.),
cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1062 (1984); Thornton v. Fondren Green Apartments, 788 F.
Supp. 928, 932 (S.D. Tex. 1992); Montana Pole & Treating Plant v. I.F. Laucks &
Co., 775 F. Supp. 1339, 1344-45 (D. Mont. 1991), affd on other grounds, 993 F.2d
676 (9th Cir. 1993); Riden v. ICI Americas, Inc., 763 F. Supp. 1500, 1505-06 (W.D.
Mo. 1991); Evenson v. Osmose Wood Preserving, Inc., 760 F. Supp. 1345, 1348 (S.D.
Ind. 1990); Cox v. Velsicol Chem. Corp., 704 F. Supp. 85, 87 (E.D. Pa. 1989); Roberts v. Dow Chem. Co., 702 F. Supp. 195, 197-99 (N.D. Ill. 1988); Ciba-Geigy Corp.
v. Alter, 834 S.W.2d 136, 141-45 (Ark. 1992).
113. See, e.g., Arkansas-Platte & Gulf Partnership v. Van Waters & Rogers, Inc.,
959 F.2d 158, 164 (10th Cir.), vacated sub nom. Arkansas-Platte & Gulf Partnership
v. Dow Chem. Co., 506 U.S. 910 (1992); Papas v. Upjohn Co., 926 F.2d 1019, 102426 (11th Cir. 1991), vacated sub nom. Papas v. Zoecon Corp., 505 U.S. 1215 (1992);
Young v. American Cyanamid Co., 786 F. Supp. 781, 783 (E.D. Ark. 1991); Herr v.
Carolina Log Bldgs., Inc., 771 F. Supp. 958, 960-61 (S.D. Ind. 1989); Fisher v. Chevron Chem. Co., 716 F. Supp. 1283, 1287-89 (W.D. Mo. 1989); Fitzgerald v.
Mallinckrodt, Inc., 681 F. Supp. 404, 406-08 (E.D. Mich. 1987); Begley v. Truly
Nolan Exterminating, Inc., 573 So. 2d 1038, 1039 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991); Little v.
Dow Chem. Co., 559 N.Y.S.2d 788, 791 (Sup. Ct. 1990); cf. Kennan v. Dow Chem.
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now find express preemption of these claims under FIFRA," 4 a
reversal that critics have greeted with some cynicism."'
One of the most broadly applicable statutes governing warning labels on consumer products is the Federal Hazardous Substances Labeling Act of 1960.11 Although it excludes food,
drugs, cosmetics, tobacco, pesticides, and fuel, the Act governs
all substances that are toxic, corrosive, irritating, or flammable,
including products such as household cleaners and paint removers.1 7 The Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC) enforces the statute, which now is designated as the Federal Hazardous Substances Act (FHSA)."5
The FHSA includes a provision preempting nonidentical state
warning label requirements,"' though the courts have been

Co., 717 F. Supp. 799, 806-07 (M.D. Fla. 1989) (finding express preemption).
114. See, e.g., Taylor AG Indus. v. Pure-Gro, 54 F.3d 555, 560-63 (9th Cir. 1995);
Lowe v. Sporicidin Int'l, 47 F.3d 124, 129 (4th Cir. 1995); Bice v. Leslie's Poolmart,
Inc., 39 F.3d 887, 888 (8th Cir. 1994); MacDonald v. Monsanto Co., 27 F.3d 1021,
1024-25 (5th Cir. 1994); King v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 996 F.2d 1346,
1349 (1st Cir.), cert. dismissed, 114 S. Ct. 490 (1993); Shaw v. Dow Brands, Inc.,
994 F.2d 364, 371 (7th Cir. 1993); Papas v. Upjohn Co., 985 F.2d 516, 518-20 (11th
Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 300 (1993); Arkansas-Platte & Gulf Partnership v. Van Waters & Rogers, Inc., 981 F.2d 1177, 1179 (10th Cir.), cert. denied,
114 S. Ct. 60 (1993); Clubine v. American Cyanamid Co., 534 N.W.2d 385, 387 (Iowa
1995); Jenkins v. Amchem Prods., Inc., 886 P.2d 869, 879-84 (Kan. 1994), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 80 (1995); Hochberg v. Zoecon Corp., 657 N.E.2d 1263, 1266 (Mass.
1995); Quest Chem, Corp. v. Elam, 898 S.W.2d 819, 820-21 (Tex. 1995) (per curiam);
Hue v. Farmboy Spray Co., 896 P.2d 682, 688-93 (Wash. 1995); cf. Gorton v. American Cyanamid Co., 533 N.W.2d 746, 754-56 (Wis. 1995) (holding that misrepresentation claim was not preempted). But see Couture v. Dow Chem. USA, 804 F. Supp.
1298, 1302 (D. Mont. 1992) (rejecting preemption); Burke v. Dow Chem. Co., 797 F.
Supp. 1128, 114041 (E.D.N.Y. 1992) (same).
115. See, e.g., R. David Allnutt, Comment, FIFRA Preemption of State Common
Law Claims After Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 68 WASH. L. REV. 859, 869-76
(1993) (criticizing recent decisions finding express preemption of common-law claims
under FIFRA); Stephen D. Otero, Note, The Case Against FIFRA Preemption: Reconciling Cipollone's Preemption Approach with Both the Supremacy Clause and Basic
Notions of Federalism, 36 WM. & MARY L. REV. 783, 809-17, 823-33 (1995) (same).
116. Pub. L. No. 86-613, 74 Stat. 372 (1960) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
§§ 1261-1278 (1994)).
117. See 15 U.S.C. § 1261(f) (1994).
118. Id. § 2079(a).
119. The preemption section provides:
Except as provided in paragraphs (2) and (3) [allowing more stringent
requirements and State exemption petitions], if a hazardous substance or
its packaging is subject to a cautionary labeling requirement under sec-
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divided over its application to positive enactments by states and
localities. 2 ' Although courts previously had rejected the preemption defense to tort claims,' 2 ' the most recent decisions
have found FHSA preemption in such cases.'22

tion 2(p) or 3(b) designed to protect against a risk of illness or injury
associated with the substance, no State or political subdivision of a State
may establish or continue in effect a cautionary labeling requirement
applicable to such substance or packaging and designed to protect against
the same risk of illness or injury unless such cautionary labeling requirement is identical to the labeling requirement under section 2(p) or
3(b).
Pub. L. No. 94-284, § 17(a), 90 Stat. 503, 510 (1976); see also 15 U.S.C. § 12Q3
(1994) (preempting fabric flammability standards); id. § 1476 (preempting child-proof
packaging standards). The Consumer Product Safety Act (CPSA), Pub. L. No. 92573, 86 Stat. 1207 (1972) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 2051-2081 (1994)),
also includes a preemption provision, but it is coupled with a savings clause that
expressly preserves liability claims under state law, see id. §§ 2074(a), 2075(a); see
also Moe v. MTD Prods., Inc., 73 F.3d 179, 182-83 (8th Cir. 1995) (holding that the
CPSA preempted failure-to-warn but not design defect claims against lawnmower
manufacturer).
120. Compare Toy Mfrs. of Am., Inc. v. Blumenthal, 986 F.2d 615, 620-24 (2d Cir.
1992) (holding that FHSA does not preempt Connecticut law requiring a warning of
the risk to children under the age of three of choking on small parts of toys intended for use by older children) and Chemical Specialties Mfrs. Ass'n v. Allenby, 958
F.2d 941, 949-50 (9th Cir.) (holding that FHSA does not preempt carcinogen warning
requirements of California's Proposition 65), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 825 (1992) with
Chemical Specialties Mfrs. Ass'n v. Clark, 482 F.2d 325, 327-28 (5th Cir. 1973) (per
curiam) (holding that local ordinance requiring detergent labeling to list ingredients
was expressly preempted).
121. See, e.g., Burch v. Amsterdam Corp., 366 A.2d 1079, 1086 (D.C. 1976) (finding
no preemption of claim involving adhesive product); cf. Gryc v. Dayton-Hudson Corp.,
297 N.W.2d 727, 737 (Minn.) (finding no preemption under the Flammable Fabrics
Act and cross-referencing savings clause in CPSA), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 921 (1980).
122. See Moss v. Parks Corp., 985 F.2d 736, 740-41 (4th Cir.) (holding that products liability claims against manufacturer of paint thinner were expressly preempted), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2999 (1993); Lee v. Boyle-Midway Household Prods.,
Inc., 792 F. Supp. 1001, 1007-09 (W.D. Pa. 1992) (finding failure-to-warn claim
involving a drain cleaner product impliedly preempted); Salazar v. Whink Prods.
Co., 881 P.2d 431, 433 (Colo. Ct. App. 1994) (rust remover), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct.
1315 (1995); Busch v. Graphic Color Corp., 644 N.E.2d 839, 844 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995)
(paint stripper), afftd, No. 78662, 1996 Ill. LEXIS 23 (Ill. Feb. 15, 1996); State ex
rel. Jones Chem., Inc. v. Seier, 871 S.W.2d 611, 614 (Mo. Ct. App. 1994) (hydrochloric acid); Jenkins v. James B. Day & Co., 634 N.E.2d 998, 1003-05 (Ohio 1994)
(paint stripper).
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3. Planes, Trains, and Automobiles
The Airline Deregulation Act of 1978 (ADA) added a preemption provision to the Federal Aviation Act (FAA), 2 ' a statute
that already included a savings clause for existing common-law
remedies. 24 As the Supreme Court held in two recent decisions, the ADA broadly preempts state laws relating to rates,
routes, or services.'25 Although tort claims were not at issue in
either case, the Court suggested that such claims would not be
preempted.' 26 In fact, lower courts generally have rejected arguments that the ADA preempts personal injury claims against
airline carriers,"' though the statute may foreclose claims
123. Pub. L. No. 95-504, § 4(a), 92 Stat. 1707 (1978) (current version at 49
U.S.C.A. § 41713(b)(1) (West 1995)). Originally, the provision appeared at 49 U.S.C.
app. § 1305(a)(1) (1988), until it was recodified and revised in 1994, purportedly
without any substantive changes. See Pub. L. No. 103-272, § 1(e), 108 Stat. 1143
(1994). At present, the statute provides that "[a] State, political subdivision of a
State, or political authority of at least 2 States may not enact or enforce a law,
regulation, or other provision having the force and effect of law related to a price,
route, or service of an air carrier." 49 U.S.C.A. § 41713(b)(1) (West 1995).
124. 49 U.S.C.A. § 40120(c) (West 1995) ("A remedy under this part is in addition
to any other remedies provided by law."). This provision was previously codified at
49 U.S.C. app. § 1506 (1988) (current version at 49 U.S.CA. § 40120(c)) ("Nothing
contained in this chapter shall in any way abridge or alter the remedies now existing at common law or by statute, but the provisions of this chapter are in addition
to such remedies.").
125. See American Airlines, Inc. v. Wolens, 115 S. Ct. 817 (1995) (holding that
ADA preempted claims under state consumer protection statute but not breach of
contract claims involving frequent flyer program); Morales v. Trans World Airlines,
Inc., 504 U.S. 374, 383-85 (1992) (observing that the words "relating to" in the statute "express a broad pre-emptive purpose," and discounting the relevance of the
older savings clause, characterizing it as a "relic of the pre-ADA/no pre-emption
regime").
126. See Wolens, 115 S. Ct. at 825 n.7 ("American [Airlines] does not urge that the
ADA preempts personal injury claims relating to airline operations."); id. at 830
(O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part) ("Morales
does not mean that personal injury claims against airlines are always preempted.").
127. See, e.g., Hodges v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 44 F.3d 334, 340 (5th Cir. 1995) (en
banc) (finding no preemption of personal injury claim alleging negligence by airline
in allowing case of rum to be stowed in overhead storage compartment); Smith v.
America West Airlines, Inc, 44 F.3d 344, 347 (5th Cir. 1995) (en banc) (finding no
preemption of claim alleging that airline was negligent in failing to prevent visibly
deranged passenger from boarding and then attempting to hijack aircraft); Jamerson
v. Atlantic S.E. Airlines, 860 F. Supp. 821, 824-26 (M.D. Ala. 1994) (listing cases
finding no preemption); Stagl v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 849 F. Supp. 179, 182
(E.D.N.Y. 1994) (finding no preemption of claim alleging negligence of airline in fail-
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arising more directly from the "services" provided by a carner.1 28 The Act, however, does not expressly or impliedly preempt design defect claims against airline manufacturers. 29
As discussed in connection with CSX Transportation,Inc. v.
3 ' the Federal
Easterwood,"
Railroad Safety Act includes a preemption provision.' In light of the Supreme Court's decision
in Easterwood, lower courts have held excessive speed claims
preempted, as long as the train was not operated in violation of
12
the applicable federal speed limit.

ing to ensure safety of passengers in baggage retrieval area), rev'd on other grounds,
52 F.3d 463, 467 (2d Cir. 1995); O'Hern v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 838 F. Supp. 1264,
1267-68 (N.D. Ill. 1993) (claim for hearing loss); Butcher v. City of Houston, 813 F.
Supp. 515, 517 (S.D. Tex. 1993) ("slip-and-fall" case); Margolis v. United Airlines,
Inc., 811 F. Supp. 318, 323-24 (E.D. Mich. 1993) (overhead compartment).
128. See, e.g., West v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 995 F.2d 148, 152 (9th Cir. 1993)
(holding that punitive, but not compensatory, damage claim brought by "bumped"
passenger was preempted), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1053 (1994); Williams v. Express
Airlines I, Inc., 825 F. Supp. 831, 833 (W.D. Tenn. 1993) (false imprisonment claim);
Howard v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 793 F. Supp. 129, 132 (S.D. Tex. 1992) (wrongful
death claims premised on airline's failure to help elderly passenger transfer to another flight).
129. See, e.g., Public Health Trust v. Lake Aircraft, Inc., 992 F.2d 291, 295 (11th
Cir. 1993) (rejecting contention that federal airworthiness regulation governing design
of seat impliedly preempts defect claim premised on a failure to use energy-absorbing design); Cleveland v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 985 F.2d 1438, 1442 (10th Cir.) (listing cases), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 291 (1993); cf. Bieneman v. City of Chicago, 864
F.2d 463, 472-73 (7th Cir. 1988) (holding that, although ADA did not preempt
landowner's nuisance claim, "[a] state court could not award damages ...
for conduct required by [federal] regulations, or for not engaging in noise-abatement procedures that the Federal Aviation Administration considered but rejected as unsafe."),
cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1080 (1989). See generally Patrick J. Shea, Note, Solving
America's General Aviation Crisis: The Advantages of Federal Preemption over Tort
Reform, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 747 (1995) (arguing in favor of broader preemption of
tort claims against aircraft manufacturers); Mark A. Valetti, Comment, Preemption of
State Law Tort Claims in the Context of Aircraft Manufacturers, 60 J. AIR L. &
CoM. 699 (1994-1995) (discussing federal preemption in the field of aviation).
130. 113 S. Ct. 1732 (1993); see supra notes 78-91 and accompanying text.
131. 49 U.S.C.
§ 20106 (West 1995).
132. See, e.g., Wright v. Illinois Cent. R.R., 868 F. Supp. 183, 186-87 (S.D. Miss.
1994); Stanton v. National R.R. Passenger Corp., 849 F. Supp. 1524, 1528 (M.D. Ala.
1994) (denying defendant's motion for summary judgment because, "[w]hile state law
is preempted as to the speed limit and Plaintiff cannot base his claim on speed if
the train's speed did not exceed 80 mph, there is a fact issue as to whether that
speed was exceeded"); Armstrong v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry., 844 F. Supp. 1152,
1153 (W.D. Tex. 1994); Watson v. Rail Link, Inc., 826 F. Supp. 487, 490 (S.D. Ga.
1993).

934

WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 37:903

Courts have experienced somewhat greater difficulty in deciding whether the FRSA preempts inadequate warning device
claims. In Easterwood, the Supreme Court found no preemption
because no federal requirement applied to the grade crossing
involved in that case, but the Court suggested that such claims
would be preempted if the federal government prescribed the
choice of warning devices as a condition of funding a highway
improvement project. 3 ' Pursuant to DOT regulations, the
warning devices installed at grade crossings must include automatic gates with flashing lights or else meet the approval of
the Secretary of Transportation, if federal funds participate in
the project.' Courts, however, have rejected preemption arguments in recent cases in which the DOT had passively accepted
rather than specifically approved the proposed warning device, ' 5 federal funding had not yet been authorized," 6 or, al-

133. See Easterwood, 113 S. Ct. at 1741 ("IFlor projects in which federal funds
participate in the installation of warning devices, the Secretary has determined the
devices to be installed and the means by which railroads are to participate in their
selection."); see also Lusby v. Union Pac. R.R., 4 F.3d 639, 641-42 (8th Cir. 1993)
(rejecting preemption defense where there was no evidence of federal funding); Richard Perez-Pena, Experts Fault U.S. on Safety Rules for Railroads, N.Y. TIMES, Feb.
25, 1996, at 26.
134. See 23 C.F.R. § 646.214(b)(3)-(4) (1995). "Examination of these regulations
demonstrates that, when they are applicable, state tort law is pre-empted."
Easterwood, 113 S. Ct. at 1740-41; see also Stanton, 849 F. Supp. at 1530-31 (holding inadequate warning device claims preempted); 60 Fed. Reg. 11,649, 11,651 (1995)
(to be codified at 49 C.F.R. pt. 234) (proposed Mar. 2, 1995) (DOT proposal to trigger preemption of grade-crossing tort claims); Kara M. Turner, Recent Development,
The Great Train Robbery That Wasn't: Practical Implications of CSX v. Easterwood,
72 WASH. U. L.Q. 1449, 1464-67 (1994). For a survey of grade-crossing preemption
decisions predating the Supreme Court's Easterwood decision, see Lewis L. Laska &
Scott Mohnkern, Federal "Preemption" Under 45 U.S.C. Section 434 of Railroad Liability Regarding Construction of Mechanical Grade Crossing Gates: A Train of Legal
Thought Going in the Wrong Direction?, 21 TRANSP. L.J. 215 (1992).
135. See, e.g., Shots v. CSX Transp., Inc., 38 F.3d 304, 307-09 (7th Cir. 1994) (noting that the "Secretary has never expressed his approval of cross-bucks or of any
other specific warning device at this crossing," and rejecting the suggestion that his
acceptance of a 1975 agreement between railroad and state constituted such approval); Eldridge v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 832 F. Supp. 328, 335 (E.D. Okla. 1993).
136. See, e.g., Armijo v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry., 27 F.3d 481, 482-83 (10th Cir.
1994) (remanding preemption question to trial court for purposes of determining
whether federal funds had participated in the installation of warning devices at the
grade crossing before the date of the accident); Hatfield v. Burlington N. R.R., 1
F.3d 1071, 1072 (10th Cir. 1993) ("[Mlore than a casual financial connection between
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though federally approved and funded, the improvement project
had not been completed at the time of the accident. 37 Products
liability claims against locomotive manufacturers have been held
impliedly preempted by a different federal statute.'3 8
As previously noted in the discussion of FreightlinerCorp. v.
Myrick,"' the NTMVSA contains both a preemption provision
and a savings clause. The Court in Freightlinerdid not, however, decide whether this statute preempts common-law claims
because it found no federal requirement applicable in that
case.' Before Cipollone, many lower courts had found implied
preemption of some tort claims, though only those claims premised on a failure to install airbags." Because the DOT had

the federal government and the project has to exist before that project is governed
and circumscribed by federal regulation.").
137. See, e.g., St. Louis S.W. Ry. v. Malone Freight Lines, 39 F.3d 864, 867 (8th
Cir. 1994) ("[P]reemption occurs when all the devices prescribed in the FHA-approved upgrade plan are installed and operating."), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1963
(1995); Earwood v. Norfolk S. Ry., 845 F. Supp. 880, 886-87 (N.D. Ga. 1993); Carpenter v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 631 N.E.2d 607, 610-11 (Ohio 1994). But see
Thiele v. Norfolk & W. Ry., 873 F. Supp. 1240, 1247-48 (N.D. Ind. 1994) (holding
that federal approval triggers preemption even before actual installation).
138. See, e.g., Marshall v. Burlington N., Inc., 720 F.2d 1149, 1152-54 (9th Cir.
1983) (applying Boiler Inspection Act); Springston v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 863 F.
Supp. 535, 540-42 (N.D. Ohio 1994) (rejecting argument that FRSA undermined
implied preemption under Boiler Inspection Act); cf. Ouellette v. Union Tank Car
Co., 902 F. Supp. 5, 10-11 (D. Mass. 1995) (holding that FRSA expressly preempted
products liability claims against manufacturer of tank car); In re Miamisburg Train
Derailment Litig., 626 N.E.2d 85, 92-94 (Ohio) (holding that FRSA did not preempt
claims premised on a failure to add reinforced brakes to tank car when its construction predated issuance of applicable regulations), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 59 (1994).
139. 115 S. Ct. 1483 (1995); see supra notes 92-101 and accompanying text.
140. 49 U.S.C.A. § 30103 (West 1995); see supra note 93 for the text of the
provision.
141. See Freightliner, 115 S. Ct. at 1487 n.3; see also supra note 98 (describing
subsequent remand by the Court of a decision rejecting preemption under the Act).
142. See, e.g., Pokorny v. Ford Motor Co., 902 F.2d 1116, 1120-25 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 498 U.S. 853 (1990); Taylor v. General Motors Corp., 875 F.2d 816, 824-27
(11th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1065 (1990); Kitts v. General Motors Corp.,
875 F.2d 787, 789 (10th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1065 (1990); Wood v. General Motors Corp., 865 F.2d 395, 402 (1st Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1065
(1990). But see Murphy v. Nissan Motor Corp. in USA, 650 F. Supp. 922, 925-28
(E.D.N.Y. 1987); Gingold v. Audi-NSU-Auto Union, A.G., 567 A.2d 312, 318-30 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1989). Most academic commentary has been critical of decisions finding
implied preemption of these so-called "no airbag" claims. See Keith C. Miller, Deflating the Airbag Pre-emption Controversy, 37 EMORY L.J. 897, 916-43 (1988); Ellen L.
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decided to allow manufacturers to choose among different passive restraint systems rather than mandate the use of airbags,
courts in these cases felt that the plaintiffs' claims would frustrate the federal government's decision, and the courts disagreed
that the statute's savings clause would preserve such claims.'
In contrast, lower courts generally did not hold preempted tort
claims involving other aspects of automobile safety and design,
even in cases in which federal regulations applied.'" After
Cipollone, this division has remained, and courts have accepted
implied (or sometimes express) preemption in cases alleging a
failure to install airbags 45 but rejected the defense in other

Theroff, Note, Preemption of Airbag Litigation: Just a Lot of Hot Air?, 76 VA. L.
REV. 577, 607-25 (1990).
143. See, e.g., Pokorny, 902 F.2d at 1125 & n.10; Taylor, 875 F.2d at 827 & n.20
(stating that savings clause could not preserve common-law claims that would create
an actual conflict with federal law); Wood, 865 F.2d at 415 (quoting with approval
the position taken in one amicus brief that "general savings clauses may not be read
literally to permit common law actions that contradict and subvert a [federal] statutory scheme").
144. See, e.g., Buzzard v. Roadrunner Trucking, Inc., 966 F.2d 777, 780-86 (3d Cir.
1992) (rejecting preemption defense to claim that lighting on truck, though in compliance with DOT requirements, was not sufficiently conspicuous); Perry v. Mercedes
Benz of N. Am., Inc., 957 F.2d 1257, 1264-66 (5th Cir. 1992) (defective airbag);
Welsh v. Century Prods., Inc., 745 F. Supp. 313, 321 (D. Md. 1990) (child safety
seat); Wohl v. Spalding & Evenflo Cos., 901 P.2d 929, 931 (Or. Ct. App. 1995)
(same). But see Crowe v. Fleming, 749 F. Supp. 1135, 114041 (S.D. Ga. 1990) (holding design defect claim premised on failure to use reflective tape preempted); Verna
v. U.S. Suzuki Motor Corp., 713 F. Supp. 823, 827 (E.D. Pa. 1989) (finding preemption of claim involving motorcycle headlamp). See generally Steven L. Holley, Note,
The Relationship Between Federal Standards and Litigation in the Control of Automobile Design, 57 N.Y.U. L. REV. 804 (1982) (discussing motor vehicle design defect
litigation).
145. See, e.g., Estate of Montag v. Honda Motor Co., No. 94-1353, 1996 U.S. App.
LEXIS 727, at *4-6 (10th Cir. Jan. 22, 1996) (implied preemption); Gills v. Ford
Motor Co., 829 F. Supp. 894, 898-99 (W.D. Ky. 1993) (implied preemption); Marrs v.
Ford Motor Co., 852 S.W.2d 570, 576-77 (Tex. Ct. App. 1993) (implied preemption);
Dykema v. Volkswagenwerk AG, 525 N.W.2d 754, 757-58 (Wis. Ct. App. 1994) (holding that tort claims premised on failure to install manual lap belts with automatic
shoulder harnesses were preempted), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 60 (1995). But see Wilson v. Pleasant, 660 N.E.2d 327 (Ind. 1995); Tebbetts v. Ford Motor Co., 665 A.2d
345, 347-48 (N.H. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 773 (1996); Loulos v. Dick Smith
Ford, Inc., 882 S.W.2d 149, 152 (Mo. Ct. App. 1994); Kurt B. Chadwell, Automobile
Passive Restraint Claims Post-Cipollone: An End to the Federal Preemption Defense,
46 BAYLOR L. REv. 141, 173-79 (1994) (arguing that Cipollone's exclusion of implied
preemption analysis whenever a statute includes an express preemption provision, a
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crashworthiness cases.'4 6
Much like the NTMVSA, the Federal Boat Safety Act
(FBSA)47 includes a provision preempting nonidentical state
performance and safety standards 48 as well as a savings
clause preserving tort liability. 4 9 Citing the airbag decisions as
persuasive authority, many courts have held that the Act preempts design defect claims for failure to install propeller guards
by virtue of the United States Coast Guard's decision not to
mandate them. 5 ' In contrast, courts generally have rejected

limitation that Freightliner subsequently weakened, will eliminate this defense
against claims alleging a failure to install airbags).
146. See, e.g., Myrick v. Freuhauf Corp., 13 F.3d 1516, 1521-22 (11th Cir. 1994)
(finding no express preemption of tort claim premised on failure to install antilock
brakes and concluding that Cipollone foreclosed any implied preemption analysis),
affd on other grounds sub non. Freightliner Corp. v. Myrick, 115 S. Ct. 1483, 148788 (1995); Contant v. Kawasaki Motors Corp., 848 F. Supp. 170, 173 (M.D. Fla.
1994) (rejecting preemption defense to claim that motorcycle lacked adequate lighting). But see Byrnes v. Honda Motor Co., 907 F. Supp. 1525, 1528 (S.D. Fla. 1995)
(accepting preemption defense to claim that motorcycle lacked adequate lighting).
147. Pub. L. No. 92-75, 85 Stat. 213 (1971) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 46 U.S.C.).
148. The FBSA states:
Unless permitted by the Secretary under section 4305 of this title, a
State or political subdivision of a State may not establish, continue in
effect, or enforce a law or regulation establishing a recreational vessel or
associated equipment performance or other safety standard or imposing a
requirement for associated equipment (except insofar as the State or
political subdivision may, in the absence of the Secretary's disapproval,
regulate the carrying or use of marine safety articles to meet uniquely
hazardous conditions or circumstances within the State) that is not identical to a regulation prescribed under section 4302 of this title.
46 U.S.C. § 4306 (1988).
149. Id. § 4311(g) ("Compliance with this chapter or standards, regulations, or orders prescribed under this chapter does not relieve a person from liability at common law or under State law.").
150. See, e.g., ,Carstensen v. Brunswick Corp., 49 F.3d 430, 432 (8th Cir.)
("Allowing a jury to assess damages for failure to install a propeller guard would
create, in effect, a state requirement that guards be installed- . . . fT]he FBSA expressly preempts such claims."), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 182 (1995); Davis v. Brunswick Corp., 854 F. Supp. 1574, 1580-82 (N.D. Ga. 1993); Shield v. Bayliner Marine
Corp., 822 F. Supp. 81, 84 (D. Conn. 1993); Shields v. Outboard Marine Corp., 776
F. Supp. 1579, 1581-82 (M.D. Ga. 1991); Mowery v. Mercury Marine, 773 F. Supp.
1012, 1016-17 (N.D. Ohio 1991); Farner v. Brunswick Corp., 607 N.E.2d 562, 567
(Ill. App. Ct. 1992); Ryan v. Brunswick Corp., 531 N.W.2d 793, 796 (Mich. Ct. App.
1995). But see Moore v. Brunswick Bowling & Billiards Corp., 889 S.W.2d 246, 25052 (Tex.) (rejecting preemption), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 664 (1994).
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preemption defenses to design 151
defect claims premised on the
installation of faulty equipment.
B. DifferentiatingBetween Various Degrees of Preemption
Although courts have generally accepted, at least under some
circumstances, preemption of common-law claims under these
various statutory provisions, important questions remain unresolved. One of the most immediate quandaries concerns the
practical consequences of a finding that a federal statute preempts one or more claims in a particular case. For instance, does
preemption mean that failure-to-warn or other tort claims may
never be brought against companies, or, instead, may a plaintiff
sustain such a claim by introducing evidence of noncompliance
with agency regulations? If the latter is true, then who bears the
burden of proof if the plantiff alleges noncompliance? Must the
defendant prove compliance as a predicate for invoking a preemption defense, or does it become an element of the plaintiffs
burden when attempting to assert a claim in the face of such a
defense? More fundamentally, is such a defense even properly
characterized as one based on "preemption," or have the courts
converted these express preemption provisions into nothing more
than a "government standards" defense?
The lower courts have offered varied answers to these questions, suggesting three different conceptions of federal preemption as applied in the context of tort litigation. As more fully
developed in the sections that follow, one may differentiate between strong, intermediate, and weak versions of the preemption defense, based in part on whether compliance with federal
safety standards is relevant and which party shoulders the burden of proof on that issue.'52 A court's choice of approaches
from among these three competing conceptions of the preemption defense may have profound consequences for litigants in

151. See, e.g., Stanley v. Bertram-Trojan, Inc., 855 F. Supp. 657, 658 (S.D.N.Y.
1994) (hatch); Rubin v. Brutus Corp., 487 So. 2d 360, 363 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986)
(seat); Ramsey v. Lucky Stores, Inc., 853 S.W.2d 623, 637-38 (Tex. Ct. App. 1993)
(lifejacket); Mulhern v. Outboard Marine Corp., 432 N.W.2d 130, 135 (Wis. Ct. App.
1988) (throttle).
152. A chart comparing these three versions appears in Table 1. See infra p. 959.
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tort cases.
1. The Strong Version: ForeclosingTort Remedies Altogether
In the wake of Cipollone, several lower courts have suggested
that preemption would completely cut off common-law claims
whenever federal safety requirements apply, whether or not a
particular company has strictly complied with those requirements. This view is most noticeable in recent medical device
cases. 5 3 For example, in Reeves v. AcroMed Corp.,'54 the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit declined the
plaintiff's "invitation to create an unwieldy exception to [preemption] in cases where manufacturers attempt to mislead the FDA
or violate FDA regulations."'55 One possible explanation for the

153. See, e.g., Gile v. Optical Radiation Corp., 22 F.3d 540, 544 (3d Cir.) ("[O]nly
the government has a right to take action with respect to adulterated products."),
cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 429 (1994); Mendes v. Medtronic, Inc., 18 F.3d 13, 19 n.4
(1st Cir. 1994). In Mendes, the First Circuit stated:
One way to ensure that a factfinder applies a standard not adding to or
differing from FDA regulations is to supplant the common law standard
with FDA's requirements. We find nothing to support that Congress intended such a radical, unwieldy form of preemption, however, particularly
where Congress did not intend to create a private right of action under
the [FD&C Act.
Mendes, 18 F.3d at 19 n.4. One should note, however, that the courts' precise resolution of this question is unclear because the plaintiffs in many of these cases never
alleged a failure to comply with agency requirements. See, e.g., id. at 19-20; see also
English v. Mentor Corp., 67 F.3d 477, 481 (3d Cir. 1995), petition for cert. filed, 133
L. Ed. 2d 594 (1995).
154. 44 F.3d 300 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S.Ct..2251 (1995).
155. Id. at 307 ("Allowing a jury or court to second-guess the FDA's enforcement of
its own regulations contravenes Congress' expressly stated intent in § 360k(a) to
eliminate attempts by states to impose conflicting requirements on medical device
manufacturers."); see also Lohr v. Medtronic, Inc., 56 F.3d 1335, 1343 (11th Cir.
1995) (holding that "preemption under the MDA cannot be defeated by a commonlaw suit alleging a violation of the statutory standards"), cert. granted, 116 S. Ct.
806 (1996); Stamps v. Collagen Corp., 984 F.2d 1416, 1425 (5th Cir.) ("[W]e acknowledge that our reading of the MDA effectively denies [plaintiffi access to state law
damages actions as a remedy for her injuries."), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 86 (1993);
King v. Collagen Corp., 983 F.2d 1130, 1139 (1st Cir.) ("[11f defendant is correct,
[plaintiffi has no cause of action."), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 84 (1993); Richman v.
W.L. Gore & Assocs., 881 F. Supp. 895, 902 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) ("This Court must leave
to the FDA an investigation of an alleged failure to comply with FDA standards,
because otherwise it might create a requirement in addition to the mandates of the
MDA."); Powers v. Optical Radiation Corp., 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d 485, 490-92 (Ct. App.
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strong version of preemption is that an agency's approval of a
specific product's labeling and design provides seemingly unassailable evidence of compliance with applicable safety standards.'56 Courts have not, however, restricted their application of the strong version of the preemption defense to situations in which a federal administrative agency has given its
actual approval. 5 '
In Talbott v. C.R. Bard, Inc., ' a device manufacturer successfully invoked the preemption defense in a wrongful death
action notwithstanding the fact that it had pled guilty to numerous charges of violating FDA requirements and had paid more
than $60 million in penalties.'5 9 As the court explained, the
MDA's preemption provision "manifests a decision by Congress
to replace completely the private rights of action usually available under state law with civil and criminal enforcement by the
federal government." 6 ' Although recognizing that this was "a
particularly poignant case," the court in Talbott felt compelled to
1995) (holding that negligence per se and other claims based on a failure to comply
with FDA regulations were preempted), withdrawn, 1995 Cal. LEXIS 6773 (Nov. 2,
1995).
156. See Welchert v. American Cyanamid, Inc., 59 F.3d 69, 73 (8th Cir. 1995) ("To
hold otherwise would be to allow state courts to sit, in effect, as super-EPA review
boards that could question the adequacy of the EPA's determination of whether a
pesticide registrant successfully complied with the specific labeling requirements of
its own regulations."); National Bank of Commerce v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 38 F.3d
988, 998-99 (8th Cir. 1994) (Loken, J., concurring) (concluding that "the agency's
finding of substantial equivalence necessarily reflected a determination that the labels comply with" the FDA's tampon labeling regulation and rejecting Judge
Heaney's contention, id. at 996, that plaintiffs expert created a genuine issue of
material fact for the jury about whether the product actually complied with that
regulation); id. at 994 n.4 ("[Actual agency approval eliminates any possible claims
under state tort law for failure to comply with federal requirements.").
157. See, e.g., Mendes, 18 F.3d at 17-19 (holding that FDA premarket clearance
would suffice); Ouellette v. Union Tank Car Co., 902 F. Supp. 5, 9 (D. Mass. 1995)
("All plaintiffs claims against UTC are preempted [by the FRSAI regardless of
whether the placement of the handrail was in compliance with the federal regulations."); Kennan v. Dow Chem. Co., 717 F. Supp. 799, 809-10 (M.D. Fla. 1989) (in
holding that plaintiffs failure-to-warn claims were expressly preempted under
FIFRA, court viewed proffered evidence concerning EPA approval as irrelevant).
158. 865 F. Supp. 37 (D. Mass. 1994), affd, 63 F.3d 25 (1st Cir. 1995), petition for
cert. filed, 64 U.S.L.W. 3593 (U.S. Feb. 16, 1996) (No. 95-1321); see supra part I.
159. Talbott, 865 F. Supp. at 39.
160. Id. at 40 (adding that "It]he government has vigorously enforced the applicable
criminal and civil laws").
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effectuate what it regarded as the "clearly expressed" belief of
Congress that "the public interest will best be served by relying
exclusively on the FDA to strike the proper balance between reasonably assuring safety and promoting innovation with regard to
new devices that have the potential both to enhance and to injure human health." 6 '
Under the strong version of preemption, even fraud claims,
framed as an allegation that agency approval was secured by the
submission of incomplete or inaccurate data, would be unavailable.' 62 In Michael v. Shiley, Inc.," for example, the Third
Circuit decided that such a fraud-on-the-agency claim was preempted, even though the plaintiff had "produced substantial
evidence that [the manufacturer] misled the FDA with false or
misleading information when it applied for Premarket Approval."" ' Noting that such a claim would require a court "to per-

161. Id. (conceding that its decision "may cause some, including those who enacted
the law, to question whether complete preemption of private rights of action is the
most fair" outcome); see also id. at 53 ("[B]alancing the cost to the few against the
benefit to the public in deciding whether preemption is appropriate is a discretionary
decision concerning public policy which is, in our democracy, committed to the politically accountable branches of government."); Ouellette, 902 F. Supp. at 10 ("While
federal preemption often means that there is no remedy available to a claimant, in
many instances unfortunately this result is necessary to vindicate the intent of Congress."). The First Circuit fully concurred in this analysis. See Talbott v. C.R. Bard,
Inc., 63 F.3d 25, 31 (1st Cir. 1995), petition for cert. filed, 64 U.S.L.W. 3593 (U.S.
Feb. 16, 1996) (No. 95-1321).
162. See, e.g., Shots v. CSX Transp., Inc., 38 F.3d 304, 308 (7th Cir. 1994) (agreeing "that the preemptive effect of a safety requirement laid down by the Secretary
[of Transportation] cannot be challenged in a tort suit by arguing to the court that
he made a mistake" because it would amount to an inappropriate "collateral challenge" to the agency's action); Papas v. Upjohn Co., 985 F.2d 516, 519 (11th Cir.)
(per curiam) ("[lit is for the EPA Administrator, not a jury, to determine whether
labelling and packaging information is incomplete or inaccurate . . . . FIFRA leaves
states with no authority to police manufacturers' compliance with the federal procedures."), cert. denied, 114 S.Ct. 300 (1993); King v. Collagen Corp., 983 F.2d 1130,
1139-40 (lst Cir.) (Aldrich, J., concurring) (concluding that plaintiffs allegation of
fraud in procuring FDA approval was inappropriate for judicial resolution), cert.
denied, 114 S. Ct. 84 (1993); Reutzel v. Spartan Chem. Co., 903 F. Supp. 1272,
1283-84 (N.D. Iowa 1995) (FIFRA).
163. 46 F.3d 1316 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S.Ct. 67 (1995).
164. Id. at 1328 ("Because of the conflict with the FDA's own efforts to monitor
and control its PMA application process, we conclude that Michael's claims for
Shiley's knowing misrepresentation to the FDA, even if provable, are pre-empted.").
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form the same functions initially entrusted to the FDA,"' the
Third Circuit concluded that the MDA "does not permit such a
searching state inquiry into the inner workings of FDA procedures." 6 Although the statute's preemption provision is broader than that applicable to cigarettes, this position is difficult to
reconcile with Cipollone's treatment of fraud claims.167
Apart from the question of whether fraud on the agency might
provide a separate basis for recovery that is not preempted,
courts abiding by the strong version of preemption have squarely
rejected the argument that allegations of fraud in procuring
approval should defeat an otherwise applicable preemption defense. 6 ' After noting that the Agency could impose civil or
criminal penalties for the submission of fraudulent information,6 9 the court in Reeves concluded that "the FDA is in the
165. Id. at 1329.
166. Id. ("This inquiry could ultimately require that a court determine whether the
information Shiley submitted was truthful, whether it was complete, whether FDA
procedures sufficed to avoid a material misrepresentation, and whether the FDA
should have or would have approved the device despite the misrepresentations."); see
also In re Orthopedic Bone Screw Prods. Liab. Litig., 1995 WL 273600, at *2 (E.D.
Pa. Mar. 2, 1995) (dismissing fraud claims as preempted by the MDA).
167. See Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 528 (1992) (plurality
opinion) (finding that the preemption provision would not foreclose recovery on a
fraud claim alleging a failure "to disclose material facts about smoking and health to
an administrative agency" if state law created a duty to disclose such information);
id. at 555 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part)
(conceding that "the hypothetical law requiring disclosure to a state regulatory agency would seem to survive' even his more sweeping interpretation of the preemption
provision). Because the other Justices would have found no claims preempted, the
Court was unanimous in regard to this dictum.
168. See Michael v. Shiley, Inc., 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1973, at *30 (E.D. Pa. Feb.
25, 1994) ("[1It would be institutionally imprudent for courts to decide whether accurate representations had been made to the FDA.'), affd in relevant part, 46 F.3d
1316, 1328-29 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 67 (1995); Kemp v. Pfizer, Inc., 835
F. Supp. 1015, 1021-22 (E.D. Mich. 1993) (declining to "substitute its rather limited
judgment in the place of the FDA's expertise, experience, and congressional mandate
to ensure that Class III medical devices comply with federal law and regulations');
ICI Americas, Inc. v. Banks, 440 S.E.2d 38, 42-43 (Ga. Ct. App. 1993) (FIFRA), affd
in relevant part, 450 S.E.2d 671, 676 (Ga. 1994); Mears v. Marshall, 905 P.2d 1154,
1166-67 (Or. Ct. App. 1995) (MDA).
169. The Agency has made it clear that it will take action, such as withdrawing
premarket approval, against anyone making fraudulent submissions. See 56 Fed.
Reg. 46,191, 46,199-200 (1991). Persons who defraud the FDA risk serious criminal
penalties. See 21 U.S.C. § 333(a)(2) (1994); United States v. Mitcheltree, 940 F.2d
1329, 1347-48 (10th Cir. 1991); United States v. Bradshaw, 840 F.2d 871, 874 (11th
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best position to decide whether AcroMed withheld material information from the agency and, if so, the appropriate sanction."' 0 For the same reason, the court in Michael rejected the
plaintiffs argument that "we should not permit Shiley to invoke
the cloak of federal pre-emption when it obtained that cloak
through the fraudulent manipulation of the regulatory process,"
concluding that this would present an even "greater interference
with the FDA's decisions" than recognition of a separate fraudon-the-agency claim.' 7 '

Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 924 (1988); Bravman v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 842 F.
Supp. 747, 760-61 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (finding that, although preemption may "encourage
manufacturers to withhold" information, "there are criminal penalties against misleading a federal regulatory agency which would deter such unscrupulous practices").
Even so, the statute "does not permit the FDA to require companies to compensate
victims for their medical expenses or for the pain and suffering resulting from a device failure." Michael, 46 F.3d at 1320. The district court in Talbott explained, however, that sentences in criminal prosecutions under the statute 'may include orders
of restitution to victims." Talbott v. C.R. Bard, Inc., 865 F. Supp. 37, 47-48 (D.
Mass. 1994) (adding that the court had erred in denying such restitution when it
sentenced Bard), affd, 63 F.3d 25, 30 (1st Cir. 1995), petition for cert. filed, 64
U.S.L.W. 3593 (U.S. Feb. 16, 1996) (No. 95-1321).
170. Reeves v. AcroMed Corp., 44 F.3d 300, 307 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct.
2251 (1995); see also Michael, 46 F.3d at 1329 ("If Shiley knowingly misled the FDA
in its PMA application, it is for the FDA to remedy that situation ... ."); Talbott,
865 F. Supp. at 45 ("Congress did not intend to establish a fraud on the FDA exception to the express preemption established by § 360k(a) of the MDA.").
171. Michael, 46 F.3d at 1329 ("If a medical device manufacturer's claim that the
MDA pre-empts a plaintiffs cause of action depends in the first instance upon proof
that its Premarket Approval was not fraudulently obtained, courts would have to
engage in the intrusive inquiry which we have just demonstrated is forbidden."). In
short, a plaintiff cannot "revive the pre-empted fraud claim by characterizing it as a
defense to pre-emption." Id.; see also Taylor AG Indus. v. Pure-Gro, 54 F.3d 555,
561 (9th Cir. 1995) (rejecting as "irrelevant" plaintiffs argument that the EPA's review of defendant's pesticide labeling had not been adequate).
Courts also have hesitated to entertain arguments that the federal regulation
being given preemptive effect in a tort suit was not lawfully promulgated by the
agency. See Busch v. Graphic Color Corp., 644 N.E.2d 839, 842 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995)
(rejecting plaintiffs argument that CPSC methylene chloride warning rule had been
adopted in violation of required rulemaking procedures), affd, No. 78662, 1996 Ill.
Feb. 15, 1996); cf. Adamo Wrecking Co. v. United States, 434 U.S.
LEXIS 23 (Ill.
275, 285 (1978) ("The narrow inquiry to be addressed by the court in a criminal
prosecution is not whether the Administrator has complied with appropriate procedures in promulgating the regulation in question, or . . . any of the other familiar
inquiries which arise in the course of an administrative review proceeding."); United
States v. Fleetwood Enters., 702 F. Supp. 1082, 1090 (D. Del. 1988) ("It was
[defendant's] responsibility to marshall its challenges to the validity of the standards
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Moreover, to recognize any such exceptions to preemption
would make allegations of fraud on the agency routine in products liability litigation and difficult to dispose of short of a trial. 2 As explained in another court's opinion:
Were the court to decide that an allegation of fraud on an
agency would save all state tort claims against Class IH
devices, then the provisions of the MDA and the intent of
Congress would be rendered a nullity. Such a decision
would circumvent the preemptive effect of section 360k,
and Congress's intent to protect manufacturers of highly
innovative and risky medical devices would be severely
undermined.173
Indeed, preemption would apply even if the agency itself determines that it was misled, as happened in the Talbott case, 7 4
though the FDA has expressed its pronounced disagreement and
even dismay with the court's conclusion.'75

and assert them properly in a timely petition for review.").
172. See Talbott, 865 F. Supp. at 47 ("If a fraud on the FDA exception exists, it is
foreseeable that it would often be alleged .. . [and] such cases would require extensive and expensive discovery. Many of them might survive motions for summary
judgment and have to be tried.").
173. Kemp v. Pfizer, Inc., 835 F. Supp. 1015, 1021 (E.D. Mich. 1993). "INleither
[the court] nor a jury has the expertise, knowledge, or experience that the FDA
has in untangling the bramble of procedures and regulations governing pre-market
approval and later reporting requirements." Id. at 1022. But see Mary L. Lyndon,
Tort Law and Technology, 12 YALE J. ON REG. 137, 175 (1995) ("[C]ourts should
not be quick to preempt common law liability and should not dismiss cases based
on information claims until there has been some opportunity for discovery of misuse or concealment ....

Agencies often cannot tell whether firms have withheld

information.").
174. Talbott, 865 F. Supp. at 47 ("The conclusion that there is not a fraud on the
FDA exception to the scope of the MDA's preemptive effect is not qualified in a case
in which the FDA has . . . already established that a manufacturer fraudulently obtained or retained FDA authorization to distribute [a device]."); see also Easterling v.
Cardiac Pacemakers, Inc., 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19333, at *19-20 (E.D. La. Dec. 29,
1995) (finding preemption of claims against the manufacturer of a pacemaker notwithstanding two FDA recalls of that model).
175. On appeal in Talbott, the Department of Justice filed an amicus curiae brief
before the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, explaining the FDA's
opposition to preemption in that case. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae,
Talbott v. C.R. Bard, Inc. (1st Cir.) (No. 94-1951), noted in 22 PROD. SAFETY & LIAB.
RPT. (BNA) 1230 (1994). Indeed, as suggested in the brief, the Department does not
believe that the MDA ever preempts common-law claims. Id. at 14 n.5. Although
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Under this extreme approach, a plaintiff could not seek compensatory damages for injuries allegedly resulting from a
manufacturer's failure to abide by federal requirements. Courts
consistently have rejected arguments that a private right of
action exists under any of the federal safety statutes.' 6 Similarly, a number of courts have rejected negligence per se claims
premised on violations of federal requirements because, otherwise, they conclude, plaintiffs could circumvent Congress's intent
not to provide a private right of action under these federal statutes. ' Even under the strong version of preemption, however,
state common law would continue to provide both a remedy and
the applicable standard of care for aspects of products or activities outside of the preempted domain."

courts will defer to agency interpretations against statutory preemption, American
Airlines, Inc. v. Wolens, 115 S. Ct. 817, 821-22, 824-25 (1995), the FDA cannot quite
so easily disavow in litigation papers what appears to be a formal and long-standing
construction of the statute, see Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 21213 (1988); but cf. Noah, supra note 104, at 187 n.20 (suggesting that these regulations have been misinterpreted by the courts).
176. See, e.g., Bailey v. Johnson, 48 F.3d 965, 967-68 (6th Cir. 1995) (FDCA);
Montauk-Caribbean Airways, Inc. v. Hope, 784 F.2d 91, 97 (2d Cir.) (FAA), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 872 (1986); In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 635 F.2d 987,
991-92 n.9 (2d Cir. 1980) (FIFRA), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1128 (1981); Handy v.
General Motors Corp., 518 F.2d 786, 788 (9th Cir. 1975) (NTMVSA); Christenson v.
St. Mary's Hosp., 835 F. Supp. 498, 501 (D. Minn. 1993) (FHSA); Brinkman v.
Shiley, Inc., 732 F. Supp. 33, 35 (M.D. Pa.) (FDCA), affd mem., 902 F.2d 1558 (3d
Cir. 1989); Sparks v. Metalcraft, Inc., 408 N.W.2d 347, 353-54 (Iowa 1987) (FHSA).
One exception is the CPSA, which does provide a private right of action. See 15
U.S.C. § 2072(a) (1994); Zepik v. Tidewater Midwest, Inc., 856 F.2d 936, 939-42 (7th
Cir. 1988).
177. See, e.g., Miller v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 880 F. Supp. 474, 480
(S.D. Miss. 1994) ("[Slince Congress did not intend to create a private right of action
under FIFRA, then any alleged violation of that statute by defendant cannot provide
a basis for a negligence per se claim."); Helms v. Sporicidin Intl, 871 F. Supp. 837,
839 (E.D.N.C. 1994) (rejecting claim premised on alleged violation of OSHA regulation, in part because of FIFRA preemption); Rodriguez v. American Cyanamid Co.,
858 F. Supp. 127, 131 (D. Ariz. 1994); see also In re Bendectin Litig., 857 F.2d 290,
313-14 (6th Cir. 1988) (noting that "the congressional decision not to provide a private cause of action under the [FDCA] becomes quite important in considering the
propriety of a state negligence per se action for violation"), cert. denied, 488 U.S.
1006 (1989).
178. See King v. Collagen Corp., 983 F.2d 1130, 1135 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S.
Ct. 84 (1993); Slater v. Optical Radiation Corp., 961 F.2d 1330, 1334 (7th Cir.) (stating that medical malpractice claims alleging improper implantation or removal of
intraocular lenses would not be preempted), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 917 (1992).
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The strong conception of the preemption defense resembles socalled "complete" preemption, a doctrine that has developed
under the federal labor statutes."' Complete preemption
means that the displacement of state law by federal statute is so
extraordinary that a defendant could remove an action from
state court under federal question jurisdiction, creating an exception to the well-pleaded complaint rule that would otherwise
ignore federal issues raised defensively.180 In other words, because of the comprehensive federal regulation of labor-management relations, a court may treat an employee's state law claims
as necessarily arising under federal law and, therefore, properly
removable to federal court. Although courts originally regarded
the existence of a parallel federal remedy as a prerequisite for
complete preemption of a state law claim, such substitution
apparently is no longer necessary to support removal.' 8 ' Courts
generally have rejected arguments that federal safety statutes
establish complete preemption, 8 2 but a few have granted removal petitions on such a theory. '

179. See Avco Corp. v. Aero Lodge No. 735, Int'l Ass'n of Machinists, 390 U.S. 557,
559-60 (1968); see also supra note 66.
180. See, e.g., Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 63-67 (1987)
(ERISA); Franchise Tax Bd. v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 2428 (1983); Brown v. Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co., 934 F.2d 1193, 1196 (11th Cir.
1991) (characterizing this as "super preemption"). See generally Mary P. Twitchell,
CharacterizingFederal Claims: Preemption, Removal, and the Arising-Under Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts, 54 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 812, 840-57 (1986) (describing the
analytical difficulties posed by allowing a preemption defense to serve as a basis for
removal under federal question jurisdiction); Eric J. Moss, Note, The Breadth of
Complete Preemption: Limiting the Doctrine to Its Roots, 76 VA. L. REV. 1601, 161118 (1990) (analyzing various approaches to the complete preemption doctrine).
181. See, e.g., Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 391 n.4 (1987); Deford v.
Soo Line R.R., 867 F.2d 1080, 1086 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 492 U.S. 927 (1989); see
also Moss, supra note 180, at 1618-25.
182. See Hurt v. Dow Chem. Co., 963 F.2d 1142, 1144-45 (8th Cir. 1992) (FIFRA);
Murray v. Commonwealth Edison, 905 F. Supp. 512, 514 (N.D. Ill. 1995) (FIFRA);
Goldstein v. W.L. Gore & Assocs., 887 F. Supp. 168, 171 (N.D. Ill. 1995) (MDA); see
also Anderson v. American Airlines, Inc., 2 F.3d 590, 597-98 (5th Cir. 1993) (rejecting complete preemption argument under the ADA); Margolis v. United Airlines,
Inc., 811 F. Supp. 318, 324 (E.D. Mich. 1993) ("The failure of Congress to provide
for a private right of action distinguishes the FAA from other areas of complete
federal preemption.").
183. See Strong v. Telectronics Pacing Sys., Inc., 891 F. Supp. 401, 402-03 (W.D.
Mich. 1994) (conceding that the MDA did not provide a substitute remedy but
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Similarly, according to some courts, preemption deprives them
of subject matter jurisdiction over any tort actions within the
preempted domain,' apparently in the sense that a federal
agency has been given exclusive jurisdiction over the matter." 5
This effect is similar to the impact of preemption under the National Labor Relations Act." 6 Because Congress assigned exclusive jurisdiction over unfair labor practice claims to the
NLRB, federal preemption strips state courts of their subject
matter jurisdiction to hear claims of this sort. 18 7 The Supreme
Court has emphasized, however, that Congress's decision to vest
exclusive jurisdiction in the NLRB "does not apply to pre-emption claims generally but only to those pre-emption claims that
go to the State's actual adjudicatory or regulatory power as

granting defendant's removal petition in medical device case on a complete preemption theory); Richardson v. Advanced Cardiovascular Sys., Inc., 865 F. Supp. 1210,
1213-16 (E.D. La. 1994) (same); Shumaker v. C.R. Bard, Inc., C.A. No. 94-11321MLW, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 822, at *6-9 (D. Mass. Jan. 3, 1996) (same); LaCoste
v. Stamps, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10634, at *6-10 (E.D. La. July 24, 1995) (FIFRA):
184. See, e.g., Pedraza v. Shell Oil Co., 729 F. Supp. 187, 189 (D. Mass. 1990), vacated, 942 F.2d 48 (lst Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1082 (1992).
185. See Talbott v. C.R. Bard, Inc., 865 F. Supp. 37, 40 (D. Mass. 1994), affd, 63
F.3d 25, 29-30 (1st Cir. 1995), petition for cert. filed, 64 U.S.L.W. 3593 (U.S. Feb.
16, 1996) (No. 95-1321). Although he did not address subject matter jurisdiction over
preempted tort claims, Professor Gardbaum has argued quite persuasively that true
preemption is a "jurisdiction-stripping" concept. Gardbaum, supra note 7, at 771
("Whereas supremacy resolves a conflict resulting from the exercise by two or more
entities of their concurrent powers, preemption implies that one entity (the federal)
has attained exclusive power on the issue."); cf Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals Inc. v.
Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 816 & n.13 (1986) (suggesting that drug manufacturer's
argument concerning federal question jurisdiction over negligence per se claim under
state law could have been, but was not, recast as a claim that the federal statute
"pre-empts state court jurisdiction over the issue in dispute"). Preemption of tort
claims in this sense, however, may be a misnomer. See International Paper Co. v.
Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481, 499-500 (1987) ("Simply because a cause of action is preempted does not mean that judicial jurisdiction over the claim is affected as well;
the [Clean Water] Act pre-empts laws, not courts.").
186. 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-197 (1994).
187. See International Longshoremen's Ass'n v. Davis, 476 U.S. 380, 391 (1986) ("If
there is pre-emption under Garmon, then state jurisdiction is extinguished."). The
Court decided, therefore, that the defense was not waivable, but it added that "those
claiming pre-emption must carry the burden of showing at least an arguable case
before the jurisdiction of a state court will be ousted." Id. at 396. Justice Blackmun
noted that this burden may pose difficulties because preemption normally is raised
in a motion to dismiss, "before facts have been developed or discovery has occurred."
Id. at 407 n.4 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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opposed to the State's substantive laws.""8 Nonetheless, some
lower courts have accorded a comparable effect to preemption
provisions in federal safety statutes, treating these provisions as
divesting them of subject matter jurisdiction over tort claims
against products or activities that are subject to regulation by
federal agencies.' 89
Of course, even if not properly regarded as an objection to
jurisdiction, the strong version of preemption would support a
defendant's motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, and no
set of proffered evidence or amended allegations could save any
claims that fall within the preempted domain. The strong version thus effectively forecloses tort remedies altogether.
2. An Intermediate Version: DisplacingTort Standards
Under a less extreme view, federal preemption of tort claims
would not completely cut off actions for damages, at least not in
the event of noncompliance with federal standards.9 0 For ex-

188. Id. at 391 n.9 ("The nature of any specific pre-emption claim will depend on
congressional intent in enacting the particular pre-empting statute.").
189. See Ryan v. Brunswick Corp., 531 N.W.2d 793, 796 (Mich. Ct. App. 1995)
("Federal preemption deprives a state court of subject-matter jurisdiction" over tort
claims for failure to install a propeller guard.); Fogal v. Steinfeld, 620 N.Y.S.2d 875,
880 (Sup. Ct. 1994) (explaining, in a medical device case, that "the defense of preemption constitutes a challenge to the court's subject matter jurisdiction"); Little v.
Dow Chem. Co., 559 N.Y.S.2d 788, 790 (Sup. Ct. 1990) (noting, in a FIFRA case,
that preemption is "essentially a question of subject matter jurisdiction . . . [that]
need not be pleaded, cannot be waived, and may be raised at any point in the
course of litigation"); Mulhern v. Outboard Marine Corp., 432 N.W.2d 130, 134 (Wis.
Ct. App. 1988) ("Federal preemption deprives a state court of subject matter jurisdiction. Therefore, the issue may be raised at any time, including for the first time
on appeal."); cf. Kennan v. Dow Chem. Co., 717 F. Supp. 799, 808 (M.D. Fla. 1989)
(treating FIFRA preemption as a waivable affirmative defense but explaining that "a
finding of preemption in this case would annul all or part of the state-created cause
of action ab initio").
190. See, e.g., Lowe v. Sporicidin Int'l, 47 F.3d 124, 130 (4th Cir. 1995) ("The central preemption question presented by this case is whether Lowe has alleged a
'breach of a FIFRA-created duty' . . . [that could form] the 'basis for a state remedy'
not be preempted."); Worm v. American Cyanamid Co., 5 F.3d 744, 748
and ...
(4th Cir. 1993) (same); Moss v. Parks Corp., 985 F.2d 736, 740 (4th Cir.) ("[in an
area of limited Congressional preemption such as the FHSA, a common law tort
action based upon failure to warn may only be brought for non-compliance with
existing federal labeling requirements."), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2999 (1993); Jenkins
v. James B. Day & Co., 634 N.E.2d 998, 1003-05 (Ohio 1994) (following Moss). But
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ample, several courts in earlier medical device cases explained
that only the substantive duties imposed under the common law
are preempted: "The question... is not the preemption of a
remedy, but whether the federal government can impose upon a
manufacturer a binding, uniform standard of conduct. The remedy is available to plaintiff, but compliance with federal law protects the defendant from the vagaries of each state's judicial system."' 9 ' Under this view, preemption does not foreclose the
availability of compensatory damages for personal injuries or
other common-law remedies, but it does mean that federal regulatory standards will trump common-law standards such as the
general duty of care under negligence. 92 Plaintiffs would not

see Talbott v. C.R. Bard, Inc., 63 F.3d 25, 29 (1st Cir. 1995) (rejecting what the
court characterized as a "theory of cooperative preemption"), petition for cert. filed,
64 U.S.L.W. 3593 (U.S. Feb. 16, 1996) (No. 95-1321); Kennan, 717 F. Supp. at 808
(finding that FIFRA's express preemption "defense tends to annul the cause of action
and not merely provide a different legal standard").
191. Stewart v. International Playtex, Inc., 672 F. Supp. 907, 910 (D.S.C. 1987); see
also Slater v. Optical Radiation Corp., 961 F.2d 1330, 1334 (7th Cir.) ("The scope of
[MDA] preemption ...is limited to efforts by states to impose sanctions for compliance with federal regulations .... It is not the sort of blanket preemption that we
find in ERISA. . . ."), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 917 (1992); Hunsaker v. Surgidev

Corp., 818 F. Supp. 744, 751 (M.D. Pa. 1992) ("Although some tort standards relating to IOLs may be federally preempted, not all causes of action are so preempted."), affd mem., 5 F.3d 1489 (3d Cir. 1993); Forrester v. Playtex Family Prods.
Corp., 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13371 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 12, 1995); Barbara L. Atwell,
Products Liability and Preemption: A Judicial Framework, 39 BUFF. L. REV. 181,
181-82 (1991) (assuming that preemption means replacing common-law standards
with a duty to comply with federal requirements).
192. See Sloman v. Tambrands, Inc., 841 F. Supp. 699, 702 (D. Md. 1993) ("Plaintiff is correct in her assertion that summary judgment is not automatically granted
when federal law preempts state claims."); Krause v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 749 F.
Supp. 164, 169 (W.D. Mich. 1990) (granting summary judgment when "defendant has
met its initial responsibility of establishing the absence of any material issue of fact"
concerning compliance with the FDA's tampon labeling requirements and plaintiff did
not respond); Lindquist v. Tambrands, Inc., 721 F. Supp. 1058, 1064-65 (D. Minn.
1989); Meyer v. International Playtex, Inc., 724 F. Supp. 288, 293-94 (D.N.J. 1988);
Stewart, 672 F. Supp. at 910; Ignace v. Playtex Family Prods., Inc., 1987 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 13609, at *19-20 (W.D. Wis. Aug. 14, 1987) ("[Ilt does not follow that the
recognition of federal preemption operates as a complete bar to plaintiffs' claim ...
• The federal regulations do nothing more than establish the standard by which the
adequacy of notices and warnings are to be judged."); Poloney v. Tambrands, Inc.,
399 S.E.2d 208, 210 (Ga. 1991) ("[Cllaims based on failure to warn (i.e., absence of
the federally required warning) and misrepresentation are not preempted by the
federal regulations.").
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be able to invite judges and juries to second-guess, under the
guise of applying a manufacturer's duty of care, an agency's
safety and utility determinations for products whose design and
labeling the agency has either dictated by regulation or individually reviewed and approved. Although admittedly beyond its
scope, the recently approved Restatement (Third) of Torts embraces this more moderate form of federal preemption.19
Because many of the preemption provisions cover only nonidentical state requirements, courts reason that state tort claims
premised on noncompliance with federal standards impose an
identical obligation and, therefore, are not preempted."M The
possibility that a company may be liable for violating federal
standards has provided courts with one way of reconciling statutory savings clauses, which preserve existing rights or remedies
at common law, with express preemption provisions.'95 Indeed,
193. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 7 cmt. e (1995), at 198
("[W]hen federal preemption is found, the legal effect is clear. Federal preemption
replaces the tort law of all states with a uniform body of federal law regulating the
relevant area of product safety."). Although this passage also could be read to support the strong version of preemption, the new Restatement clearly evinces a more
limited notion of federal preemption in its discussion of the special liability rules
governing pharmaceutical products. See id. § 8 cmt. b, at 213 ("Where such preemption is found as a matter of law, liability cannot attach when the manufacturer has
complied with the applicable regulatory standard.").
194. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Collagen Corp., 67 F.3d 1268, 1282 (7th Cir. 1995) (declining to hold "that an adulteration claim based on a product's failure to meet PMA
standards-standards that have been explicitly set forth by the FDA-does not survive MDA preemption"), petition for cert. filed, 64 U.S.L.W. 3593 (U.S. Feb. 20, 1996)
(No. 95-1323); National Bank of Commerce v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 38 F.3d 988,
993 (8th Cir. 1994) ("[Wlhen a statute only preempts state requirements that are
different from or in addition to those imposed by federal law, plaintiffs may still
recover under state tort law when defendants fail to comply with the federal requirements."); Moss, 985 F.2d at 740-41 (FHSA); Blanchard v. Collagen Corp., 909 F.
Supp. 427, 436-37 (E.D. La. 1995) (MDA); cf. Worm, 5 F.3d at 748 ("Allowing such
actions, however, is substantially distinguishable from accepting the argument that
the state common law duty to warn is not 'in addition to or different from' the
federally defined duty."). The counterargument, drawing on complete preemption
decisions, posits that an award of damages for injuries allegedly caused by violations
of federal standards is "in addition to" the federal choice of sanctions and should,
therefore, be preempted. Cf. Amalgamated Ass'n of Street, Elec. Ry. & Motor Coach
Employees v. Lockridge, 403 U.S. 274, 288-89 n.5 (1971) (NLRA). But cf. Note, Getting Away with Murder: Federal OSHA Preemption of State Criminal Prosecutions for
Industrial Accidents, 101 HARV. L. REv. 535, 541-53 (1987) (criticizing suggestions
that federal sanctions would preempt state criminal law).
195. See, e.g., Davis v. Brunswick Corp., 854 F. Supp. 1574, 1581 (N.D. Ga. 1994)
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one of these savings clauses preserves only "remedies" at common law,'9 6 supporting an interpretation of preemption as affecting the content of tort law duties but not altering the availability of damages for any breach of these duties.
The intermediate version of preemption may therefore be
understood as nothing more than a choice-of-law principle,'9 7
directing courts to select federal, rather than state, standards
when resolving tort claims.' Although a failure to state a

(suggesting that the FBSA's. "savings clause would include claims for failure to meet
regulatory standards"); Timothy Wilton, Federalism Issues in "No Airbag" Tort
Claims: Preemption and Reciprocal Comity, 61 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1, 21-27 (1986);
see also Pauline E. Calande, Note, State Incorporationof Federal Law: A Response to
the Demise of Implied Federal Rights of Action, 94 YALE L.J. 1144, 1159-60 (1985)
(discussing whether Congress has prohibited the states from using federal law as the
applicable duty of care).
196. See 49 U.S.C.A. § 40120(c) (West 1995) (FAA); Bieneman v. City of Chicago,
864 F.2d 463, 471 (7th Cir. 1988) ("Statutes of this sort save common law remedies
even when federal law exclusively determines the content of substantive rules."), cert.
denied, 490 U.S. 1080 (1989); Von Anhalt v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 735 F. Supp.
1030, 1031 (S.D. Fla. 1990) (explaining that this clause "expressly saves state law
remedies and not state law claims"); cf. Offshore Logistics, Inc. v. Tallentire, 477
U.S. 207, 232 (1986) (holding that Death on the High Seas Act's clause saving state
remedies was only a "jurisdictional saving clause," preserving concurrent state court
authority to entertain the federal cause of action, rather than a "substantive law
saving clause," preserving state wrongful death statute from federal preemption).
Other savings clauses, however, refer more broadly to "liability" at common law. See
46 U.S.C. § 4311(g) (1988) (FBSA); 49 U.S.C.A. § 30103(e) (West 1995) (NTMVSA).
197. See Rehabilitation Inst. v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y, 131 F.R.D. 99, 10001 (W.D. Pa. 1990) (treating ERISA preemption as analogous to choice-of-law rules
and, therefore, a waivable affirmative defense), affd mem., 937 F.2d 598 (3d Cir.
1991); Billy Jack for Her, Inc. v. New York Coat, Suit, Dress, Rainwear & Allied
Workers' Union, 511 F. Supp. 1180, 1187 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
Federal preemption is not, by its nature, an affirmative defense to a
[Ilt is wiser to view the preemption docstate law cause of action ....
trine as being analogous to a choice-of-law principle. That is, preemption
analysis simply tells the court what law, state or federal, should be referred to in order to determine the plaintiffs right to relief in a given
case.

Billy Jack, 511 F. Supp. at 1187; see also Louise Weinberg, The Federal-State Conflict of Laws: "Actual" Conflicts, 70 TEY. L. REv. 1743, 1796-97 (1992) (arguing that
matters of federal preemption generally should be resolved by reference to choice-oflaw principles).
198. See Violette v. Smith & Nephew Dyonics, Inc., 62 F.3d 8, 10-12 (1st Cir. 1995)
(holding that MDA preemption is a waivable choice-of-law argument rather than a
jurisdictional choice-of-forum objection); Gonzales v. Surgidev Corp., 899 P.2d 576,
582-83 (N.M. 1995) (same); cf. Kenepp v. American Edwards Lab., 859 F. Supp. 809,
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claim objection may be made as late as the trial on the merits, 9 9 preemption understood merely as a choice-of-law objection would represent an affirmative defense that may be waived
if not raised in a timely fashion. °°
Plaintiffs would be able to recover under state law for injuries
in the event that a manufacturer violated the conditions contained in any applicable product license or regulation."0 ' Indeed, in many jurisdictions, violations of federal requirements
may constitute negligence per se,2 °2 although not all jurisdic-

815 (E.D. Pa. 1994) (assuming, without deciding, that FIFRA preemption is a
waivable choice-of-law argument rather than a jurisdictional choice-of-forum objection). But see Kennan v. Dow Chem. Co., 717 F. Supp. 799, 808 (M.D. Fla. 1989)
(rejecting choice-of-law interpretation of FIFRA preemption). In some sense, preemption under the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1994), has been treated as
a choice-of-law rule, although as a choice between different states' laws rather than
a choice between federal and state law, see International Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479
U.S. 481, 499 & n.20 (1987); cf. International Longshoremen's Ass'n v. Davis, 476
U.S. 380, 391 & n.9 (1986) (noting that, "[w]hen a state proceeding or regulation is
claimed to be pre-empted by the NLRA under Garmon, the issue is a choice-of-forum
rather than a choice-of-law question" but adding that the outcome might differ if a
statute were only preempting "the State's substantive laws").
199. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(h)(2).
200. See, e.g., Piekarki v. Home Owners Say. Bank, FSB, 956 F.2d 1484, 1489
(8th Cir. 1992); Brown v. Trustees of Boston Univ., 891 F.2d 337, 363-64 (1st Cir.
1989); see also Larry Kramer, Interest Analysis and the Presumption of Forum Law,
56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1301, 1305 (1989) (discussing the choice-of-law objection).
201. See Reiter v. Zimmer, Inc., 830 F. Supp. 199, 204 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (deciding
that, although strict liability claims were preempted, plaintiff's allegations that
"Zimmer did not comply with its own FDA approved manufacturing process" would
not be dismissed pending further discovery); Rinehart v. International Playtex, Inc.,
688 F. Supp. 475, 477-78 (S.D. Ind. 1988) (finding express preemption of warning
claims but denying summary judgment because an unresolved question remained
concerning defendant's compliance with the FDA's tampon labeling requirements).
202. See, e.g., Stanton v. Astra Pharmaceutical Prods., Inc., 718 F.2d 553, 565 (3d
Cir. 1983) (failure to report adverse drug experiences); Lowe v. General Motors
Corp., 624 F.2d 1373, 1380 (5th Cir. 1980) (NTMVSA violation); Orthopedic Equip.
Co. v. Eutsler, 276 F.2d 455, 460-61 (4th Cir. 1960) (device misbranding). See generally Paul Sherman, Use of Federal Statutes in State Negligence Per Se Actions, 13
WHITTIER L. REV. 831, 877-83 (1992) (describing the different states' approaches to
negligence per se). Generally, of course, a plaintiff could sustain a negligence or
products liability claim without proving noncompliance with an applicable safety
standard. See Wenzel v. Boyles Galvanizing Co., 920 F.2d 778, 782 n.1 (11th Cir.
1991); Kennan v. Dow Chem. Co., 717 F. Supp. 799, 807 (M.D. Fla. 1989) ('|Ulnder
Florida law, plaintiff need not establish the absence of preemption of state law by
federal law as an element of her prima facie cases of either negligence or strict
liability in tort.").
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tions recognize this rule."' Under the intermediate version of
preemption described in this section, courts essentially allow
only such negligence per se claims to go forward. Although it
would not defeat a defense under the intermediate version of
preemption, a fraud-on-the-agency claim, like a negligence per se
claim, also might remain available under state law. 04
Preemption would not depend on compliance with the federal
standard; instead, a jury may find a defendant liable only in the
event (and only to the extent) that the plaintiff can demonstrate
noncompliance with that standard. Preemption of common-law
claims suggested in the tampon cases, for example, evidently
would not depend on a defendant's first proving compliance with
FDA requirements.0 5 After all, preemption of positive state
enactments does not vary depending on each manufacturer's

203. See, e.g., Sheridan v. United States, 969 F.2d 72, 75 (4th Cir. 1992) (holding
that violation of government regulation barring servicemen from having a weapon on
base does not constitute negligence per se); Swift v. United States, 866 F.2d 507,
508-09 (1st Cir. 1989) (finding violation of safety statute not negligence per se);
Eimers v. Honda Motor Co., 785 F. Supp. 1204, 1208 (W.D. Pa. 1992) (holding that
violation of administrative rule or regulation is never negligence per se). Others may
be disinclined to use federal, as opposed to state, standards in this fashion. See, e.g.,
R.B.J. Apartments, Inc. v. Gate City Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 315 N.W.2d 284, 290 (N.D.
1982) (stating that "principles of federalism" prevent states from adopting a federal
statute as the standard of care in state negligence actions when no private cause of
action exists under the federal statute); supra note 177 (citing decisions rejecting
negligence per se claims when Congress failed to provide a private right of action
under the statute).
204. See, e.g., Evraets v. Intermedics Intraocular, Inc., 34 Cal. Rptr. 2d 852, 858
(Ct. App. 1994) ("[Tlhere is no evidence of a congressional intent to exonerate from
liability manufacturers who engage in deceit to obtain approval to market their
product."). But see Mitchell v. Collagen Corp., 67 F.3d 1268, 1283 (7th Cir. 1995)
(rejecting fraud-on-the-agency claim as preempted even though it would have entertained a noncompliance claim), petition for cert. filed, 64 U.S.L.W. 3593 (U.S. Feb.
20, 1996) (No. 95-1323); Michael v. Shiley, Inc., 46 F.3d 1316, 1328-29 (3d Cir.)
(holding that fraud-on-the-agency claim was preempted and that evidence of any
fraud could not be used to defeat preemption under the MDA), cert. denied, 116 S.
Ct. 67 (1995).
205. See, e.g., Rinehart, 688 F. Supp. at 477-78; Evraets, 34 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 859
("State actions which echo or attempt to enforce federal standards are not preempted. . . . In applying a negligence per se theory, the state's requirements are equal to
the federal requirements; in fact, they simply adopt the federal standard of conduct."). But see Powers v. Optical Radiation Corp., 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d 485, 490-91 (Ct.
App. 1995) (disagreeing with Evraets), withdrawn, 1995 Cal. LEXIS 6773 (Nov. 2,
1995).
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proof of compliance with federal law." 6 Instead, plaintiffs attempting to sustain claims affected by this type of preemption
would have to prove any alleged failures to comply with federal
requirements. Rather than supporting either an objection to
subject matter jurisdiction or a removal petition, preemption in
these cases is a ground for either a motion to dismiss for failure
to state a claim or a motion for summary judgment."'7
With the proliferation of more or less detailed (and often ambiguous) regulatory requirements, gauging compliance may be
difficult. Courts can resolve questions of compliance with the
statutory labeling requirements for cigarettes with relative ease,
but efforts to determine whether a device manufacturer has
complied fully with the requirements found in a premarket approval and any generally applicable regulations could present
serious difficulties. The matter would, of course, be simple if an
agency successfully had prosecuted the defendant for a regulatory infraction.0 ' As a general matter, litigants may be able to
use formal agency decisions to estop collaterally the other party
from relitigating a previously decided issue." 9 Although less

206. Cf 45 Fed. Reg. 67,326, 67,328 (1980) (noting that the MDA preempts state
requirements when they are different from, or in addition to, FDA requirements, not
only when they directly conflict with FDA requirements).
207. See, e.g., Myrick v. Freuhauf Corp., 795 F. Supp. 1139, 1140 (N.D. Ga. 1992),
rev'd on other grounds, 13 F.3d 1516 (11th Cir.), affd sub nom. Freightliner Corp. v.
Myrick, 115 S. Ct. 1483 (1995); Crowe v. Fleming, 749 F. Supp. 1135, 1137 (S.D.
Ga. 1990). As the Supreme Court observed in a somewhat different context,
"[o]rdinarily federal pre-emption is raised as a defense to the allegations in a
plaintiffs complaint." Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987).
208. See Talbott v. C.R. Bard, Inc., 865 F. Supp. 37, 39-41 (D. Mass. 1994) (describing criminal prosecution of a manufacturer of cardiac catheters), affd, 63 F.3d
25 (1st Cir. 1995), petition for cert. filed, 64 U.S.L.W. 3593 (U.S. Feb. 16, 1996) (No.
95-1321). Even in such a case, however, whether the charges relate directly to the
device at issue in the tort action may be unclear. See id. at 47 ("The parties dispute
whether Bard admitted fraud on the FDA concerning the three lumen Mini Profile
catheter used in Mrs. Beavers' angioplasty in connection with its guilty plea in the
criminal case.").
209. See Astoria Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Solimino, 501 U.S. 104, 107 (1991)
("We have long favored application of the common-law doctrines of collateral estoppel . . . to those determinations of administrative bodies that have attained
finality."); cf. Jetcraft Corp. v. FlightSafety Int'l, Inc., 781 F. Supp. 687, 694 (D.
Kan. 1991) ("In addition to the lack of mutuality, and the informal nature of the
FAA proceedings, Jetcrafts arguments of collateral estoppel must fail . . . [because the] FAA's finding of a violation of § 61.57(c) related solely to record-keep-
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clearly probative of noncompliance, formal citations alleging a
violation also may support a negligence per se claim.1 0
At the other extreme, a plaintiff may argue that, notwithstanding the agency's silence on the matter, the defendant has failed to
comply with an applicable regulation. In some situations, a court
will experience little difficulty resolving such questions,"' but

ing requirements . .

").

210. For instance, FDA warning letters will express the Agency's opinion that a
company has violated a regulation and threaten formal enforcement actions, such as
product seizures, if the manufacturer fails to bring itself into prompt compliance.
Compare Professionals & Patients for Customized Care v. Shalala, 847 F. Supp.
1359, 1365 (S.D. Tex. 1994) (holding that warning letters do not constitute final
agency action but instead "merely establish a dialogue between the FDA and the
pharmacist and do not necessarily lead to further sanctions"), affd, 56 F.3d 592, 599
(5th Cir. 1995) with Den-Mat Corp. v. United States, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12233
(D. Md. Aug. 17, 1992) (holding that issuance of FDA warning letter was agency
action ripe for judicial review). Informal concerns expressed by agency employees,
however, should be given no special solicitude on the matter of noncompliance. See,
e.g., 21 C.F.R. § 10.85(j)-(k) (1995) (stating that advisory opinion may not be used to
illustrate a legal requirement and that statements made by FDA employees are
informal communications that do not constitute advisory opinions).
211. See, e.g., Moss v. Parks Corp., 985 F.2d 736, 741-42 (4th Cir.) (affirming summary judgment for manufacturer of paint thinner, agreeing that the product complied with all applicable CPSC labeling regulations notwithstanding plaintiffs argument that FHSA required stronger warnings), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2999 (1993);
Sloman v. Tambrands, Inc., 841 F. Supp. 699, 703 (D. Md. 1993) (finding "no genuine issue of fact concerning Tampaxes compliance with federal labeling regulations");
cf. National Bank of Commerce v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 38 F.3d 988, 996 (8th Cir.
1994) ("I cannot say that the label in question complied with the FDA requirements
as a matter of law, and I would instead leave this question for the factfinder.");
Jenkins v. James B. Day & Co., 634 N.E.2d 998, 1004-05 (Ohio 1994) (rejecting
motion for summary judgment because plaintiff's expert raised genuine issues of
material fact concerning compliance with FHSA requirements).
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often the inquiry will be quite complicated.2 12 Not surprisingly,
courts sometimes get it wrong.213
Because of such difficulties, courts generally recognize that
agencies should exercise primary jurisdiction over regulatory
matters within their special expertise.2 14 Indeed, this is one of
the premises underlying the strong version of preemption discussed in the previous section. Short of avoiding the compliance
issue altogether through complete preemption, however, courts
should differentiate between situations in which a regulatory infraction is apparent, as when the agency undertakes an enforcement action, and other cases in which the plaintiff has alleged
only some failure to comply with an ambiguous requirement. In

212. See, e.g., Lowe v. Sporicidin Int'l, 47 F.3d 124, 130 (4th Cir. 1995) (noting that
a comparison of claims made in labeling and advertising "does not clearly establish-one way or the other-whether the advertisement claims" violate FIFRA but
deciding that the court "need not resolve this knotty question" because summary
judgment for the manufacturer could be affirmed on grounds other than preemption);
Bammerlin v. Navistar Int'l Transp. Corp., 30 F.3d 898, 900 (7th Cir. 1994) (finding
that the trial judge made a "serious mistake" by leaving jury to interpret the meaning of ambiguous motor vehicle safety standards); Sandoz Pharmaceuticals Corp. v.
Richardson-Vicks, Inc., 902 F.2d 222, 231 (3d Cir. 1990) (declining to decide, in private trademark litigation, how the FDA might interpret and apply its ambiguous
drug labeling regulations); In re Air Crash Disaster at Detroit Metro. Airport, 791 F.
Supp. 1204, 1223 (E.D. Mich. 1992) ("IT]o a lay person who is not versed in the
FAA regulatory scheme, the FAA orders and regulations for airport improvement
projects contain vague, confusing, and, at times, seemingly inconsistent language . . .
."); Paul H. Rubin, Are PharmaceuticalAds Deceptive?, 49 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 7, 1011 (1994).
213. For example, in Mendes v. Medtronic, Inc., 18 F.3d 13, 17-18 (1st Cir. 1994),
the court opined that a design modification to a pacemaker previously cleared by the
FDA would not require the submission of a new premarket notification, an interpretation that is clearly incorrect, see Noah, supra note 104, at 208-10 & n.135. Similarly, in Reeves v. AcroMed Corp., 44 F.3d 300, 305-06 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 115
S. Ct. 2251 (1995), the court found no violation of FDA restrictions on the promotion
of unapproved uses, also representing an error in comprehending the full import of
the agency's applicable regulations. See 59 Fed. Reg. 59,820, 59,821-25 (1994) (describing the FDA's policy on off-label uses of drugs and devices); Lars Noah, Constraints on the Off-Label Uses of Prescription Drug Products, 16 J. PROD. & TOXICS
LIAB. 139, 146, 153-56 & n.80 (1994).
214. See, e.g., Weinberger v. Bentex Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 412 U.S. 645, 654 (1973)
("Threshold questions within the peculiar expertise of an administrative agency are
appropriately routed to the agency, while the court stays its hand."); Biotics Research Corp. v. Heckler, 710 F.2d 1375, 1376 (9th Cir. 1983) (stating that the basis
for granting primary jurisdiction to the FDA is the agency's technical and scientific
expertise); 21 C.F.R. § 10.25(b) (1995) (asserting primary jurisdiction for the FDA).
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any case, under the intermediate version, claims premised on
noncompliance would provide plaintiffs with their sole avenue
for relief.
3. The Weak Version: Compliance As a Predicate
Under the weakest version of preemption suggested by courts
in the wake of Cipollone, defendants would shoulder the burden
of proving compliance as a predicate for successfully invoking
the preemption defense.215 Rather than serving either as a subject matter jurisdiction objection or as grounds for dismissal or
summary judgment for failure to state a claim, litigants would
frame preemption arguments as an affirmative defense. Because
'
otherwise the public would be left unprotected, 16
plaintiffs
might be able to defeat the weak version of the preemption defense altogether by demonstrating noncompliance. This conception of preemption differs from the intermediate version described in the previous section, which only forecloses recovery on
tort claims premised on state law duties other than the duty to
comply with any applicable (federal) safety standards.
Because the reported cases poorly elaborate the weak version,
though perhaps Cipollone itself is an example, 217 one must
summarize it by comparison to the other conceptions of the preemption defense described previously.2 18 If compliance is undisputed, the outcome will be indistinguishable from the result
under the other two versions of preemption. Under both the
strong and intermediate versions, the preemption defense is not
dependent on proof of compliance. Courts abiding by the intermediate version recognize negligence per se claims, but no color-

215. See, e.g., St. Louis S.W. Ry. v. Malone Freight Lines, 39 F.3d 864, 867 (8th

Cir. 1994) (holding that FRSA "preemption occurs when all the [warning] devices
prescribed in the FHA-approved [crossing] upgrade plan are installed and operating"), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1963 (1995). Requiring proof of compliance, however,
would make no sense in those cases in which a court gives preemptive effect to a

decision against imposing any federal requirement. See, e.g., Mowery v. Mercury Marine, 773 F. Supp. 1012, 1016-17 n.8 (N.D. Ohio 1991) (propeller guard claim).
216. See St. Louis S.W. Ry., 39 F.3d at 867 ("To encourage prompt installation of
federally prescribed warning devices, a railroad's common-law duty of care must
continue until those devices are installed.").
217. See infra notes 249-55 and accompanying text.
218. For a comparison, see Table 1, infra p. 959.
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able basis would exist for pursuing such claims in the event that
compliance is undisputed. Similarly, even if the defense is predicated on proof of compliance, a defendant would escape potential
tort liability when no party disputes that it complied with the
applicable federal requirements.
In the event of a dispute over compliance, however, the weak
version differs from the intermediate version by placing the
burden of proof on the defendant. Because the intermediate
version of preemption does not make the defense hinge on compliance but, rather, preserves negligence per se claims, plaintiffs
would carry the frequently difficult burden of establishing noncompliance in order to recover damages for their injuries. Under
the weak version, in contrast, preemption does not even come
into play until the defendant has proven compliance with federal
requirements. In light of the potential complexities posed by
questions of compliance,219 this difference in the allocation of
the burden may be quite important. Although the plaintiff still
shoulders the burden of proof on the underlying tort claims, the
defendant's failure to carry the burden with regard to questions
of compliance would entirely remove federal preemption from
the case (and perhaps invite a negligence per se claim by the
plaintiff).

219. See supra notes 208-14 and accompanying text.
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PREEMPTION TYPOLOGIES
STRONG VERSION

INTERMEDIATE

WEAK VERSION

Characterization:

Complete preemption (jurisdiction objection or possible
grounds for a removal petition)

Motion to dismiss
for failure to state
claim; choice-of-law
issue (waivable)

Affirmative defense
(subject to waiver)

Noncompliance:

Irrevelant

Basis for a negligence per se claim
(plaintiffs burden)

Eliminates defense
(defendant's burden)

Agency Fraud:

Irrelevant

Irrelevant (though
may provide separate claim)

Allows plaintiff to
defeat preemption

TABLE

1

Furthermore, under the weak version of preemption, even if the
defendant establishes compliance, plaintiffs may be able to escape the defense by alleging fraud on the agency."' As noted
previously,2 2 ' courts applying the stronger versions of preemp-

220. See Hurley v. Lederle Lab. Div. of Am. Cyanamid Co., 863 F.2d 1173, 1179-80
(5th Cir. 1988) (holding that a limited form of implied "specific" preemption for vaccines would be lost if a jury concluded that an application for approval contained
misrepresentations about the product's safety: "the only question that can be presented to the jury consistent with the federal regulatory scheme is whether the manufacturer withheld, either at the time the FDA decided the content of the warning, or
since then, information that would have changed the FDA's decision"); Roberson v.
E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 863 F. Supp. 929, 932-33 (W.D. Ark. 1994) (holding
that a defendant "may be estopped from asserting FIFRA pre-emption to the extent
that it withheld material facts from the agency"); Butcher v. Robertshaw Controls
Co., 550 F. Supp. 692 (D. Md. 1981) (holding that injured consumers could pursue
claim alleging fraud on the CPSC). Some recent federal products liability reform
proposals would explicitly condition liability protection for manufacturers of drugs
and medical devices on the absence of any fraud or misrepresentation in securing
FDA approval. See H.R. 956, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. § 201(f)(1)(B) (1995) ("Common
Sense Product Liability and Legal Reform Act of 1995," as passed by the House of
Representatives on March 10, 1995); S. 687, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. § 203(b)(2)(A)
(1993) ("Product Liability Fairness Act"); see also 42 U.S.C. §§ 300aa-22(b)(2), 300aa23(d)(2) (1988 & Supp. V 1993) (National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act's prerequisites for defense to failure-to-warn and punitive damage claims).
221. See supra part HI.B.1.
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tion have rejected such allegations as an impermissible collateral attack on an agency's decisions.2 22
Finally, if noncompliance is fairly apparent, the weak version
may differ from the intermediate version, in the sense that the
federal safety standards completely drop out of sight, even if
noncompliance is only partial. For example, failure to abide by
FDA labeling requirements in a premarket approval may expose
the manufacturer to both failure-to-warn and design defect
claims, even if no evidence demonstrates that the device deviated from design specifications in the product license. Under the
intermediate version, in contrast, plaintiffs could only pursue a
negligence per se failure-to-warn claim under these circumstances. Second, under the weak version, the defendant's conduct may
be judged against a more stringent common-law standard of care
in the event of noncompliance, so that even trivial deviations
from federal requirements may be regarded as sufficiently extreme departures from the state law standard of reasonable care
to support the imposition of punitive damages.22
IV. PREEMPTION RECONCEPTUALIZED

In the face of such confusion over the proper application of
statutory preemption provisions in tort litigation, one might
favor the simplicity of a clear statement rule, demanding that
Congress specifically enumerate tort claims as preempted before
displacing common-law remedies." We are not, however, writ222. See King v. Collagen Corp., 983 F.2d 1130, 1139-40 (1st Cir.) (Aldrich, J., concurring) (declining to follow the suggestion in Hurley that a jury was the appropriate
factfinder for allegations that information was withheld), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 84
(1993); Papas v. Upjohn Co., 926 F.2d 1019, 1026 n.8 (11th Cir. 1991) (rejecting the
approach suggested in Hurley, at least as applied to FIFRA-regulated pesticides),
vacated sub nom. Papas v. Zoecon Corp., 505 U.S. 1215 (1992), modified, 985 F.2d
516, 519 (11th Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 300 (1993); supra notes
162-75 and accompanying text.
223. See, e.g., Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 243-44, 258 (1984)
(stating that, even when violations of federal regulations were at most inconsequential, jury could award punitive damages absent preemption).
224. See Ferebee v. Chevron Chem. Co., 736 F.2d 1529, 1543 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1062 (1984); Hernandez-Gomez v. Leonardo, 884 P.2d 183, 190 (Ariz.
1994) ("Such a rule transfers the decision about preemption and its reach from the
post-hoc speculation of lawyers to the forum where it should be argued: the legislature, where the competing interests may be reconciled before the statute is passed."),
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ing on a clean slate. Because the plurality's judgment in
25 a
Cipollone has been embraced fully by the Supreme Court,"
clear statement rule seems unrealistic at this juncture.
Alternatively, courts might reconsider implied private rights
of action under federal statutes that they have given sweeping
preemptive effect. In a sense, however, this approach would
attempt to fix one arguable error in construing congressional intent-namely, the recent tendency to find express preemption of
tort claims notwithstanding congressional silence-with what
might well be a second error. Instead, by understanding preemption of tort claims as the government standards defense, courts
could make sense of Cipollone without giving it the extreme
effect suggested by the strong version of preemption.
A. Revisiting Implied PrivateRights of Action
As one possible solution to the growing recognition of broad
preemption in tort litigation, courts could be more willing to
imply private rights of action in statutes with preemption provisions. 6 Indeed, plaintiffs sometimes include federal statutory

vacated sub nom. Volkswagen of Am., Inc. v. Hemandez-Gomez, 115 S. Ct. 1819
(1995) (remanded for further consideration in light of Freightliner Corp. v. Myrick,
115 S. Ct. 1483 (1995)); Wolfson, supra note 8, at 111-14; see also S. 480, 103d
Cong., 1st Sess. (1993) (proposed "Preemption Clarification and Information Act").
But see Susan J. Stabile, Preemption of State Law by Federal Law: A Task for Congress or the Courts?, 40 VILL. L. REV. 1, 78-91 (1995) (arguing that Congress should
leave the courts free to balance federalism and other considerations in deciding
whether a particular federal statute preempts state law). See generally William N.
Eskridge & Philip P. Frickey, Quasi-Constitutional Law: Clear Statement Rules As
Constitutional Lawmaking, 45 VAND. L. REV. 593 (1992) (debating the desirability of
the Supreme Court's creation of "super-strong" clear statement rules as a way to
focus Congress's attention on certain constitutional values); Note, Clear Statement
Rules, Federalism, and Congressional Regulation of States, 107 HARv. L. REv. 1959
(1994) (concluding that clear statement rules have an essential role in the Supreme
Court's federalism jurisprudence).
225. See CSX Transp., Inc. v. Easterwood, 113 S. Ct. 1732, 1737 (1993); see also
Freightliner, 115 S. Ct. at 1488 (acknowledging the possibility that tort claims may
be hnpliedly preempted even if not expressly preempted under an applicable statutory provision); cf. Chatowski, supra note 101, at 801 (arguing that Cipollone embraced
a type of clear statement rule).
226. See, e.g., Stuart J. Starry, Federal Preemption in Commercial Aviation: Tort
Litigation Under 49 U.S.C. § 1305, 58 J. AIR L. & COM. 657, 688-93 (1993); cf.
Sherman, supra note 202, at 876-77 (noting the incongruity "that injuries resulting
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claims in complaints in which preemption may be raised as a
defense to the state law claims.22 ' Nonetheless, apparently
feeling bound by long-standing precedent rejecting implied private rights of action under these federal statutes, courts have
denied such claims at the same time that they have found preemption of plaintiffs' remedies under state law." 8
In Cort v. Ash, 29 the Supreme Court announced a four-factor test for determining whether to find an implied private right
of action under a federal statute. The test questions whether (1)
the plaintiff is a member of the class for whose benefit the statute was enacted, (2) there is any indication of congressional
intent to create a private remedy, (3) a private remedy would be
consistent with the underlying purposes of the legislative
scheme, and (4) the cause of action is one traditionally reserved
for state law, so that it would be inappropriate to infer one
based solely on federal law. 30 In more recent decisions, the
Court has placed primary emphasis on the second question, the

from violations of federal statutory standards cannot be redressed in any forum" as
the scope of preemption expands while implied private rights of action contract).
The refusal to recognize the creation of a federal cause of action, coupled
with a finding of federal preemption, may result in the elimination of
any private cause of action for injuries suffered as a result of a
defendant's conduct. The state cause of action in tort is eliminated, and
not replaced by any federal action ....
ITihis is clearly not the intent of
Congress in adopting the overwhelming majority of statutes in the consumer protection area.
Id. at 906-07.
227. See, e.g., Hodges v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 44 F.3d 334, 340 n.13 (5th Cir. 1995)
(en banc) (describing negligence per se theory as plaintiffs "falback position").
228. See, e.g., Gile v. Optical Radiation Corp., 22 F.3d 540, 544 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 429 (1994); Kemp v. Pfizer, Inc., 835 F. Supp. 1015, 1022 & n.5
(E.D. Mich. 1993); see also supra note 177 (citing decisions rejecting negligence per
se claims when Congress provided no private right of action under the statute).
229. 422 U.S. 66 (1975).
230. Id. at 78.
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intent of Congress.' Even so, courts still apply the Cort v.
Ash test in instances in which that intent is ambiguous.2 32
As indicated earlier, courts have not found implied private
rights of action under federal safety statutesY3 Nonetheless, a
reexamination of these decisions in light of the growing acceptance of preemption could lead to a different result today because preemption would appear to alter the analysis significantly . ' For example, if courts interpret a federal statute as completely foreclosing tort remedies under state law, then it is no
longer inappropriate to infer a federal cause of action merely because the cause of action was one traditionally available under
state law. The intermediate version of preemption, which allows
tort claims to proceed if premised on negligence per se for violations of federal requirements, would have much the same effect
as implying a private right of action. 5 Even then, recognizing
a federal right of action might be preferable because the tort
laws of some jurisdictions do not accept claims solely premised
on violations of federal safety standards."3

231. See, e.g., Texas Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 639
(1981); Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 568-71 (1979). See generally
Robert HA. Ashford, Implied Causes of Action Under Federal Law: Calling the Court
Back to Borak, 79 Nw. U. L. REV. 227 (1984) (questioning the continued vitality of
implied rights of action and reviewing historical development of the Supreme Court's
approach); H. Miles Foy, III, Some Reflections on Legislation, Adjudication, and Implied Private Actions in the State and Federal Courts, 71 CORNELL L. REV. 501, 56271 (1986) (discussing Cort v. Ash and the role of legislative intent in implied remedies); Tamar Frankel, Implied Rights of Action, 67 VA. L. REV. 553 (1981) (discussing the soundness of implied causes of action for securities-law violations).
232. See, e.g., Suter v. Artist M., 503 U.S. 347, 363-64 & n.16 (1992); Daily Income
Fund, Inc. v. Fox, 464 U.S. 523, 536 (1984); Texas Indus., 451 U.S. at 639 ("Congressional intent may be discerned by looking to the legislative history and other
factors: e.g., the identity of the class for whose benefit the statute was enacted, the
overall legislative scheme, and the traditional role of the states in providing relief.").
233. See supra note 176 (citing decisions rejecting arguments that private causes of
action exist under federal safety statutes).
234. See Starry, supra note 226, at 689 ("Those courts were not operating under
the assumption that all state tort claims relating to air carrier operations were
preempted. Surely, if they had been, their analysis under Cort v. Ash would have
been different.").
235. Indeed, this similarity has inclined some courts against allowing negligence
per se claims for violations of federal requirements when there is no private right of
action under the statute. See supra note 177 (citing cases).
236. See supra note 203 (citing cases).
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Courts, however, could use a finding of express preemption as
further support for the conclusion that Congress did not intend
to create a private remedy.2 37 Courts also hesitate to imply private rights of action to avoid providing litigants with federal
question jurisdiction. Unlike the intermediate version of preemption, recognition of a private right of action might burden the
federal courts unnecessarily with fairly routine personal injury
claims. For these and other reasons, although courts rejected
implied private rights of action in cases predating the widespread acceptance of the preemption defense to tort claims,
courts will not likely revisit these decisions.
B. Adopting the Government StandardsDefense
Instead of revisiting the possibility of recognizing implied
private rights of action, courts should view preemption provisions as nothing more than a decision by Congress to give companies a defense to state tort liability if they have complied with
federal safety standards. Of the three different conceptions of
preemption, Cipollone supports only the weak version. Although
denoted "preemption," this version of preemption more closely
resembles the government standards or approval defense. First,
one must review the traditional rule that compliance provides no
defense to tort liability.
1. Regulatory Compliance Is Rarely Dispositive
In most jurisdictions, evidence of compliance with a government safety standard is relevant but rarely dispositive in assessing allegations that a product is defective or that the
defendant's conduct was negligent. Several courts argue that
government standards establish only minimum requirements,

237. See Mendes v. Medtronic, Inc., 18 F.3d 13, 19 n.4 (1st Cir. 1994); Talbott v.
C.R. Bard, Inc., 865 F. Supp. 37, 45 (D.Mass. 1994), affd, 63 F.3d 25, 30 (1st Cir.
1995), petition for cert. filed, 64 U.S.L.W. 3593 (U.S. Feb. 16, 1996) (No. 95-1321); cf
Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 814 (1986) (using the
absence of an implied private right of action as further support for holding that
there was no federal question jurisdiction). In some instances, moreover, congressional intent against providing a remedy is so clear that a court would never look to
the fourth factor. See In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 635 F.2d 987, 991-92
n.9 (2d Cir. 1980) (FIFRA), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1128 (1981).
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requirements that a jury can find a reasonable person should
have exceeded in certain situations." The hesitancy to recognize a compliance defense is of even older vintage than is the
negligence per se rule.2 9 The statutory safety standards in
many of the earliest cases were quite limited in scope, often
lacked an enforcement mechanism, and sometimes expressly
preserved common-law tort remedies.2 4 ° In the century since
the development of the common-law rule against recognizing a
regulatory compliance defense, however, the complexity of government regulation has increased profoundly.24 Courts, however, continue to give little or no weight to compliance with today's
far more intricate regulatory regimes, frequently dismissing the
defense out of hand with the oft-repeated and largely unexamined premise that government safety standards are nothing
more than minimum requirements.
Although some federal statutes and agency regulations really
have only such limited purposes,24 2 modern regulatory systems
more typically represent legislative or administrative efforts to
set optimal, not minimal, safety standards. A few jurisdictions

238. See, e.g., Perry v. Mercedes Benz of N. Am., Inc., 957 F.2d 1257 (5th Cir.

1992).
239. See, e.g., Grand Trunk Ry. v. Ives, 144 U.S. 408, 421 (1892) (holding that
giving signals required by law does not always render railroad free from negligence).
240. See Paul Dueffert, Note, The Role of Regulatory Compliance in Tort Actions,
26 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 175, 182 (1989). "The perspective of the Second Restatement ... is based upon the simple statutory schemes and railroad crossing accidents of the nineteenth century." Id. at 208.
241. Id. at 217. "Against such complex regulatory schemes, the rule that regulatory
compliance cannot shield a defendant from liability seems archaic." Id. at 218.
242. See, e.g., Cleveland v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 985 F.2d 1438, 1445 (10th Cir.)
(emphasizing that federal airworthiness regulations only purport to represent "minimum standards"), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 291 (1993); Perry, 957 F.2d at 1264-65
(noting that NHTSA regulations are only "minimum standards"). But see Wood v.
General Motors Corp., 865 F.2d 395, 414 (1st Cir. 1988) ("Although the standards
are 'minimum' in the sense that a manufacturer may make a vehicle safer than required by federal law, the standards are not 'minimum' in relation to state law."),
cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1065 (1990); Wilson v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 577 P.2d 1322,
1333 (Or. 1978) (en banc) (Linde, J., concurring) (noting that FAA regulation "represents a more deliberate, technically intensive program to set and control a given
level of safety ... than is true of many run-of-the-mill safety regulations"); ef. Ray
v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151, 165-69 (1978) (finding that state statute
governing oil tanker design would have been preempted by federal law, even though
the latter referred only to "minimum standards of design").
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have recognized a government standards defense in limited circumstances, either as a matter of judicial decision" or in connection with recent codifications of state tort rules,2 " and the
Restatement (Second) of Torts accepted judicial authority to
decide that compliance with particular government standards
would provide a defense to tort liability."

243. See Lorenz v. Celotex Corp., 896 F.2d 148, 152 (5th Cir. 1990) ("[Clompliance
with government safety standards . . constitutes strong and substantial evidence
that a product is not defective."); Hurley v. Lederle Lab. Div. of Am. Cyanamid Co.,
863 F.2d 1173, 1179 (5th Cir. 1988); O'Gilvie v. International Playtex, Inc., 821
F.2d 1438, 1442 (10th Cir. 1987) (approving jury instruction that included presumption of nondefectiveness for compliance with FDA tampon labeling requirement unless plaintiff proved that a reasonable person would have done more), cert. denied,
486 U.S. 1032 (1988); Coley v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 768 F. Supp. 625, 629
(N.D. Ill. 1991) (compliance with Nuclear Regulatory Commission's radiation exposure regulations provided conclusive proof of non-negligence); Dentson v. Eddins &
Lee Bus Sales, Inc., 491 So. 2d 942, 944 (Ala. 1986) (holding conclusive as to defectiveness of a bus a state law that did not require passenger seat belts); Ramirez v.
Plough, Inc., 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d 97, 102 (Cal. 1993) ('[Tlhere is some room in tort
law for a defense of statutory compliance."); Jefferson County Sch. Dist. v. Gilbert,
725 P.2d 774, 777-80 (Colo. 1986) (finding no liability when intersection conformed
to city manual); Josephson v. Meyers, 429 A.2d 877, 880-81 (Conn. 1980) (deciding
that bus driver complied with all statutory requirements regarding safe discharge of
passengers); McDaniel v. McNeil Lab., Inc., 241 N.W.2d 822, 828 (Neb. 1976) (finding FDA approval of drug "not necessarily conclusive" as to whether drug was safe,
but safety should not be challenged simply because some experts may differ); Montgomery v. Royal Motel, 645 P.2d 968, 970 (Nev. 1982) (stating that, when motel
met required standard, there was no liability for criminal assault on guests by
unknown assailant).
244. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-116-105(a) (Michie 1987); COLO. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 13-21-403(1)(b) (West 1987); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3304(a) (1994); N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 2A:58C-4 (West 1987) (FDA-specific); N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-01.3-09(3) (Supp.
1995); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2307.76(C) (Baldwin 1994); TENN. CODE ANN. § 2928-104 (1980); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-15-6(3) (1992); Grundberg v. Upjohn Co., 813
P.2d 89, 96-97 (Utah 1991) (applying defense to FDA-approved drug product).
245. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 288C cmt. a (1965) ("Where there are no
such special circumstances, the minimum standard prescribed by the legislation or
by the court as a matter of law, as sufficient for
regulation may be accepted ...
the occasion . . . ."); see also Model Uniform Prod. Liab. Act § 108, 44 Fed. Reg.
62,714, 62,730 (1979) (noting relevance of legislative or regulatory standards); 2 ALI
REPORTERS' STUDY, ENTERPRISE RESPONSIBILITY FOR PERSONAL INJURY 95-101 (1991)
(describing rationales for recognizing a compliance defense); Dueffert, supra note
240, at 217 ("Regulatory compliance most often stands as a defense where the governing statute (1) tightly controls the defendant's conduct, (2) obviously reflects a
careful balancing of the interests usually gauged in determining negligence at common law, and (3) carries substantial sanctions for failure to comply.").
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Nonetheless, rejection of the government standards defense
remains by far the prevailing rule. The American Law
Institute's project to restate products liability law in the Restatement (Third) of Torts does not recognize a rebuttable presumption of nondefectiveness in cases in which a defendant has complied with comprehensive government safety standards that
were intended to provide an optimal level of safety. 6 The new
Restatement also distinguishes between federal preemption and
the government standards defense by noting that the former
cuts off tort liability as a matter of law under the Supremacy
Clause, while the latter might simply provide a common-law defense to tort liability." As argued in the next section, this suggested distinction may overstate the real difference between
these two notions.
2. PreemptionAs the Government StandardsDefense
Although compliance with federal safety standardstraditionally has not protected companies from tort liability,
under the strong version of preemption, companies are now
immunized from liability even if they violated these standards.
Surely, this is a remarkable situation. As this section will conclude, preemption of tort claims should, at most, be understood
as adopting the government standards defense. The weak version of preemption, which seems closely akin to the compliance
defense, 8 shows greater fidelity to recent Supreme Court deci246. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORT: PRODS. LIAB., supra note 193, § 7 &
cmt. e.
247. See id. § 7 cmt. e, at 197-98 ("[A] determination that there is preemption
nullifies otherwise operational state law ....
Judicial deference to federal product
safety statutes or regulations occurs not because the court concludes that compliance
with the statute or regulation shows the product to be nondefective; the issue of
defectiveness under state law is never reached.').
248. See supra part III.B.3; see also State ex rel. Jones Chems., Inc. v. Seier, 871
S.W.2d 611, 614 n.1 (Mo. Ct. App. 1994) ("The parties have approached this matter
as pre-emption of the common law cause of action of inadequate or improper labeling. It might also be approached as a question of duty wherein compliance with the
federal labeling mandate serves as a matter of law to establish no further duty or
no breach . . . ."). Compare Wood v. General Motors Corp., 865 F.2d 395, 401 n.8
(1st Cir. 1988) ("Preemption is a concept both narrower and different from an ordinary [compliance] defense."), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1065 (1990) with id. at 426
(Seyla, J., dissenting) ("It would be a strange 'savings clause' indeed which could
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sions in this area.
Several aspects of Cipollone undergird the weak version of
preemption. First, the statutory provision at issue in the case
made compliance a predicate for invoking the defense. 9 This
element of the preemption provision has received little or no
attention, however, in part because the tobacco companies have
conscientiously used the mandatory warning statements in their
labeling. Although the statutory provision is entitled "Preemption,"25 by demanding compliance as a prerequisite for preemption, the cigarette labeling law more closely resembles other
federal statutes adopting a compliance defenseY Second, because the statute itself specifies the text of these statements,
compliance should be simple to determine. Presumably, in the
event of noncompliance, a plaintiff alleging injuries from cigarettes would be free to pursue failure-to-warn and related tort
claims on theories other than noncompliance with the federal
labeling requirement. Arguably, this weak version is not really
preemption at all. 2

salvage an action on the merits in this fashion but be impuissant to stop preemption, when the effect on uniformity of regulation and manufacture would be precisely
the same in either case.") and Ferebee v. Chevron Chem. Co., 736 F.2d 1529, 1540
(D.C. Cir.) ("Unless FIFRA preempts a state from making these choices, a state jury
may find a product inadequately labeled despite EPA's determination that, for purposes of FIFRA, the label is adequate."), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1062 (1984).
249. 15 U.S.C. § 1334(b) (1994) (preempting imposition of requirements or prohibitions under state law with respect to cigarettes "labeled in conformity with the provisions of this chapter"). The possibility that a state could enact legislation mandating more stringent warning statements and enforcement sanctions for any cigarettes
that the manufacturer did not label in conformity with the federal statute seems
somewhat odd, but nothing in the legislative history sheds further light on this
aspect of the preemption provision.
250. Id.
251. For example, the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act provides a limited
compliance defense against failure-to-warn and manufacturing defect claims. See 42
U.S.C. §§ 300aa-22(b), 300aa-23(d) (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
252. See Gardbaum, supra note 7, at 773 ("Under any version of the principle of
supremacy, a finding of conflict applies only to the specific state measure at issue,
whereas preemption applies to every measure in the given field. In other words,
supremacy necessitates case-by-case analysis on an ex post basis."); see also id. at
805 ("In short, preemption eliminates the need to consider the content of state laws
on the subject, to lay the two laws side by side to ascertain whether or not they
conflict."). This contrast seems overdrawn, however, because Congress may choose a
limited scope of preemption that requires some evaluation of the terms or effect of
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Cipollone certainly cannot support the strong version of preemption, in part because of the plurality's distinction between
pre- and post-1969 failure-to-warn claims. If the 1969 amendments were understood as completely preempting failure-towarn claims, then the preemption provision would foreclose any
tort actions founded on such claims brought after 1969, whether
or not some of the defendant's alleged negligence pre-dated enactment of the statute." Instead, of course, the Cipollone plurality distinguished between claims grounded on conduct occurring before and after passage of the preemption provision.'
Finally, by differentiating among numerous tort claims and only
finding preemption of a limited class that was based on a failure
to warn, the plurality's decision in Cipollone left a number of
alternative grounds for recovery available to plaintiffs. The practical result of preemption, therefore, was not particularly harsh
in that case. 5

state law. See, e.g., 7 U.S.C. § 136v(b) (1994) (preempting any state "requirements
for [pesticide] labeling or packaging in addition to or different from those required
under this subchapter").
253. Although retroactive application of statutes generally is disfavored, see
Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 114 S. Ct. 1483, 1496-1505 (1994), complete preemption, operating as a jurisdictional rule, see id. at 1501-02, would foreclose claims
filed after enactment, even if premised on conduct pre-dating the statute, see Arkansas-Platte & Gulf Partnership v. Van Waters & Rogers, Inc., 959 F.2d 158, 160-61
(10th Cir.) (holding that FIFRA preempted failure-to-warn claims even though
defendant's allegedly negligent conduct entirely pre-dated enactment of the preemption provision), vacated, 506 U.S. 910 (1992), reinstated, 981 F.2d 1177, 1178 (10th
Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 60 (1993); Kennan v. Dow Chem. Co., 717 F. Supp.
799, 811 (M.D. Fla. 1989) (same).
254. See Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 522-24 (1992) (plurality
opinion); see also Kotler v. American Tobacco Co., 685 F. Supp. 15, 18 (D. Mass.
1988) (holding that postenactment claims against cigarette manufacturer alleging
negligence prior to 1966 were not preempted), affd, 926 F.2d 1217 (1st Cir. 1990),
vacated, 505 U.S. 1215 (1992). Such an approach is also consistent with the intermediate version of preemption, in the sense that courts would judge pre-enactment
conduct against any then prevailing tort-law standards of care rather than the subsequently announced uniform federal standard. See Landgraf, 114 S. Ct. at 1506-07;
Mojica v. Gannett Co., 7 F.3d 552, 558 (7th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1643
(1994); Desmarais v. Dow Corning Corp., 712 F. Supp. 13, 15 (D. Conn. 1989) (noting that failure-to-warn claims would have been preempted had plaintiffs breast
prostheses been implanted after enactment of the MDA but not in a case in which
they were implanted before the date of enactment).
255. Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 524-31; see also Slater v. Optical Radiation Corp., 961
F.2d 1330, 1334 (7th Cir.) (listing alternatives to products liability claims preempted
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Although preemption provisions in other statutes are broader
than that applicable to cigarettes, 56 Cipollone does not clearly
dictate the recognition of more sweeping preemption defenses in
those cases. None of the other federal safety statutes includes a
similar compliance prerequisite in the text of the preemption
provision, and compliance with requirements imposed under
those statutes is also harder to determine," but these are reasons for narrowing or distinguishing Cipollone rather than for
unthinkingly giving it even greater effect under those other statutes."
In particular, the absence of substitute remedies
should incline courts against finding preemption of tort law

by the MDA), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 917 (1992); Jenkins v. Amchem Prods., Inc., 886
P.2d 869, 884 (Kan. 1994) ("Plaintiff still has viable causes of action to remedy the
harm he allegedly suffered by defendants' products even though one theory of liability [i.e., failure to warn] is preempted [under FIFRA]."), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 80
(1995); cf. Michael v. Shiley, Inc., 46 F.3d 1316, 1326 (3d Cir.) (holding that express
warranty claim survived because otherwise the MDA would eliminate "all legal remedies to the purchaser"), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 67 (1995); Lohr v. Medtronic, Inc.,
56 F.3d 1335, 1342-43 (11th Cir. 1995) (same), cert. granted, 116 S. Ct. 806 (1996).
But cf. William T. Smith, III & Kathryn M. Coonrod, Cipollone's Effect on FIFRA
Preemption, 61 UMKC L. REV. 489, 501 (1993) (suggesting that federal preemption
of failure-to-warn claims against pesticide manufacturers will have a significant impact on plaintiffs because design defect and other claims are more difficult to pursue); Junda Woo, Tobacco Firms Still Are Facing Many Lawsuits, WALL ST. J., Nov.
9, 1992, at A3 (reporting that the plaintiffs in Cipollone voluntarily dismissed their
remaining claims after remand from the Supreme Court because their counsel had
withdrawn for financial reasons).
256. See, e.g., 21 U.S.C. § 360k(a) (1994) (preempting all state and local medical
device requirements that differ or add to a safety or effectiveness requirement or
any other requirement under the MDA).
257. See Talbott v. C.R. Bard, Inc., 63 F.3d 25, 29 (1st Cir. 1995) (emphasizing
that the MDA nowhere conditioned preemption on compliance), petition for cert. filed,
64 U.S.L.W. 3593 (U.S. Feb. 16, 1996) (No. 95-1321); Palmer v. Liggett Group, Inc.,
825 F.2d 620, 628-29 n.13 (1st Cir. 1987) (distinguishing individualized label approvals under FIFRA from the precise cigarette warnings mandated by Congress).
258. See Richard C. Ausness, Federal Preemption of State Products Liability Doctrines, 44 S.C. L. REV. 187, 258-59 (1993); Lyndon, supra note 173, at 140 ("The
courts seem drawn to the preemption doctrine in part out of exasperation with the
shortcomings they perceive in tort law. When the statutory bases for preemption are
less than compelling, the sense that tort law itself is dysfunctional may tip the balance against liability."); Weinberg, supra note 197, at 1751 ("The current majority,
appointees of the Reagan and Bush administrations, . . . might want corporate defendants to have the benefit of a defense of compliance with some federal requirement. One majority might relish a new federal [preemption] defense, but another
equally conservative majority might scruple to fashion one at common law.").
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claims unless congressional intent to foreclose such claims is unmistakable." Of course, the plurality in Cipollone and the majority in Easterwood did not construe the respective statutes so
narrowly, but then only the weaker versions of preemption discussed above seem appropriate."' Interpreting preemption provisions as establishing a government standards defense would
promote the goal of federal uniformity without foreclosing tort
remedies when federal safety standards have been violated.
In a sense, courts would be recognizing a federal common-law
defense against state tort claims when a product or activity is
subject to regulation under a federal statute that contains a
preemption provision. In Boyle v. United Technologies Corp.,2"'
the Supreme Court recognized an analogous defense against
products liability claims for government contractors, specifically
in the context of military equipment. Although there was no conflict with any particular federal law, the Court decided that the
threat of liability for design defects under state law could conflict with important federal interests, 6 ' so it elected to displace

259. See, e.g., Hodges v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 44 F.3d 334, 338 & n.8 (5th Cir.
1995) (en banc) (noting that "neither the ADA nor its legislative history indicates
that Congress intended to displace the application of state tort law to personal physical injury inflicted by aircraft operations, or that Congress even considered such
preemption," and contrasting "the ADA with ERISA legislation, in which Congress
provided several federal causes of action to replace the preempted state causes");
Abbot v. American Cyanamid Co., 844 F.2d 1108, 1112 (4th Cir.) (noting that the
presumption against preemption is particularly strong when there is no federal remedy), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 908 (1988); Ministry of Health v. Shiley Inc., 858 F.
Supp. 1426, 1440 (C.D. Cal. 1994) ("If the intent of Congress were to nullify an
entire body of state consumer protection law, and leave the victims without a remedy, it would have specifically said so."); Margolis v. United Airlines, Inc., 811 F.
Supp. 318, 324 (E.D. Mich. 1993) ("Preemption under [the ADA] was not intended to
be an insurance policy for air carriers against their own negligence .... [Otherwise]
injured plaintiffs would be left without any remedy for serious physical injuries.");
Burke v. Dow Chem. Co., 797 F. Supp. 1128, 1132, 1140-41 (E.D.N.Y. 1992)
(FIFRA); Callan v. G.D. Searle & Co., 709 F. Supp. 662, 665 (D. Md. 1989) (MDA);
Kociemba v. G.D. Searle & Co., 680 F. Supp. 1293, 1300 (D.Minn. 1988) (MDA).
260. In Easterwood, for example, the Court affirmed preemption of the plaintiffs
excessive speed claim when the defendant had not exceeded the DOT's 60 mph limit.
See CSX Transp., Inc. v. Easterwood, 113 S. Ct. 1732, 1742 (1993). Because the
parties did not dispute compliance, however, the Court did not have any occasion to
rule on the possible effect of noncompliance on the preemption defense.
261. 487 U.S. 500 (1988).
262. Id. at 509.
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state law by crafting the government contractor defense as a
matter of federal common law.263 The majority found that
"the procurement of equipment by the United States is an
area of uniquely federal interest,"2 which made it necessary
to determine next whether state law might conflict with this
interest.2 65
The Court in Boyle conceded that tort claims would not always pose a sufficiently serious conflict with the federal interest
to justify the displacement of state law. 6 6 In searching for a
limiting principle, the majority relied on the discretionary functions exception of the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA),267 even
though it only preserves sovereign immunity for government
officials under limited circumstances, to frame the appropriate
scope of this defense under federal common law.2" As formu263. Id. at 510.
264. Id. at 507. The Court noted that "uniquely federal interests" included the
rights and obligations of the United States under its contracts as well as civil liability of federal officials for actions taken in the course of their duties, both of which
were implicated indirectly by liability rules applicable to independent government
contractors. See id. at 504-05. In particular, the majority speculated that the "imposition of liability on Government contractors will directly affect the terms of Government contracts: either the contractor will decline to manufacture the design specified
by the Government, or it will raise its price." Id. at 507; see also id. at 511-12 (arguing that the cost of judgments against contractors will be passed on to the government through higher prices). But see id. at 521 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("The
relationship at issue is at best collateral to thie Government contract.").
265. The Court stated:
The conflict with federal policy need not be as sharp as that which must
exist for ordinary pre-emption . . . . Or to put the point differently, the
fact that the area in question is one of unique federal concern changes
what would otherwise be a conflict that cannot produce pre-emption into
one that can.
Id. at 507-08 (footnote omitted). In other cases, however, the Court also has inquired
about the desirability of uniformity before deciding to displace state law with a
federal common-law rule. See, e.g., United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S.
715, 739-40 (1979).
266. See Boyle, 487 U.S. at 509 ("No one suggests that state law would generally
be pre-empted in this context."). For example, if "a federal procurement officer orders, by model number, a quantity of stock helicopters that happen to be equipped
with escape hatches opening outward, it is impossible to say that the Government
has a significant interest in that particular feature." Id.
267. Ch. 753, tit. IV, 60 Stat. 842 (1946) (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 28 U.S.C.).
268. See Boyle, 487 U.S. at 511 (finding that permitting plaintiffs to second-guess
military equipment design judgments "through state tort suits against contractors
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lated by the majority, the defense provides that:
Liability for design defects in military equipment cannot be
imposed, pursuant to state law, when (1) the United States
approved reasonably precise specifications; (2) the equipment
conformed to those specifications; and (3) the supplier warned
the United States about the dangers in the use of the equipment that were known to the supplier but not to the United
States.269
As in the weak version of preemption, a contractor would have to
identify the government requirements that trigger the defense,
demonstrate compliance with those specifications, 270 and not be
guilty of fraud or misrepresentation in its dealings with the government.27 ' Although the defense originated in the context of
military equipment, -a few courts have extended the defense to
other products purchased by the federal government. 2

would produce the same effect sought to be avoided by the FTCA exemption"). The

Court noted that designing military equipment "often involves not merely engineering analysis but judgment as to the balancing of many technical, military, and even
social considerations, including specifically the trade-off between greater safety and
greater combat effectiveness." Id.
269. Id. at 512. But see id. at 516 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (arguing that "this
Court lacks both authority and expertise to fashion such a rule"); id. at 532
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (preferring to "defer to the expertise of the Congress"). For a
thorough analysis of the defense predating the decision in Boyle and also largely
anticipating the Court's formulation of the defense, see Richard Ausness, Surrogate
Immunity: The Government Contract Defense and Products Liability, 47 OmHO ST. L.J.
985 (1986).
270. See Boyle, 487 U.S. at 512; Mitchell v. Lone Star Ammunition, Inc., 913 F.2d
242, 245-46 (5th Cir. 1990) (refusing to apply defense to manufacturing defects because production processes were not specified by the government); Nicholson v. United Technologies Corp., 697 F. Supp. 598, 603 (D. Conn. 1988) (recognizing that the
defense will not apply to manufacturing defect claims when the manufacturer fails to
meet specifications); see also William M. Carley, A Defense Contractor Gets Tough
Scrutiny for Defective Products, WAUL ST. J., Feb. 27, 1996, at Al.
271. See Carley v. Wheeled Coach, 991 F.2d 1117, 1125 (3d Cir.) ("The defendant
bears the burden of proving each element of the defense."), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct.
191 (1993). In Carley, the Third Circuit reversed summary judgment for the defendant because, though the first two elements of the defense were met, "there is no
evidence on record showing that Wheeled Coach warned the GSA about dangers in
its ambulance that were known to Wheeled Coach but not to the GSA." Id. at 1126;
see also id. at 1127 ("The Supreme Court specifically adopted the third prong to
prevent manufacturers from having an incentive to withhold knowledge of risks.").
272. See id. at 1120-25 (ambulance); Johnson v. Grumman Corp., 806 F. Supp. 212,
217 (W.D. Wis. 1992) (postal truck); Carole A. Loftin, Note, Expansion of the Govern-
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Commentators have criticized the Boyle decision on a number
of different grounds."' Even so, the case for recognizing a government standards defense for compliance with federal safety requirements is stronger than the argument for the contractor
defense in Boyle. Under the government standards defense,
courts can interpret the express preemption provisions in the
relevant statutes to justify the recognition of such a defense as a
matter of federal common law, rather than relying on the
FTCA's discretionary functions exception, as did the majority in
Boyle.274 Although courts generally reserve the development of

ment Contractor Defense: Applying Boyle to Vaccine Manufacturers, 70 TEX. L. REV.
1261, 1290-96 (1992). But see In re Hawaii Fed. Asbestos Cases, 960 F.2d 806, 81012 (9th Cir. 1992) (distinguishing military equipment from otherwise commercially
available products sold to the government); In re Chateaugay Corp., 146 B.R. 339,
348-51 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (stating that products designed to advance civilian objectives
would not be shielded from liability); Steven B. Loy, Note, The Government Contractor Defense: Is It a Weapon Only for the Military?, 83 KY. L.J. 505, 516-28 (19941995) (arguing against extension of defense to nonmilitary government contractors).
Reasoning that labeling often represents an important aspect of product design, some
courts also have extended the defense to cover failure-to-warn claims. See, e.g.,
Nicholson, 697 F. Supp. at 603 ("Duty to warn claims can also be viewed as a type
of design defect under the theory that warnings in general are safety components of
the product.").
273. See, e.g., Ronald A. Cass & Clayton P. Gillette, The Government Contractor
Defense: ContractualAllocation of Public Risk, 77 VA. L. REV. 257 (1991) (questioning assumptions about the behavior of procurement officers and, therefore, about the
appropriate default rules for the liability of government contractors); Michael D.
Green & Richard A. Matasar, The Supreme Court and the Products Liability Crisis:
Lessons from Boyle's Government Contractor Defense, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 637 (1990)
(criticizing both the Court's justification for adopting a federal common-law rule and
the particular version of the government contractor defense that it chose); Louise
Weinberg, Federal Common Law, 83 Nw. U. L. REv. 805, 848-49 (1989) (arguing
that Boyle's preemption analysis was "somewhat inaccurate" and that recognition of
a federal defense was far more intrusive on state-created rights than recognition of a
preemptive federal right of action).
274. See Boyle, 487 U.S. at 511. As in Boyle, although the federal interest seems
less compelling, government approval of a consumer product normally would fall
within the discretionary functions exception, see Berkovitz v. United States, 486 U.S.
531, 545-47 (1988), and a tort claim against the manufacturer would involve some
'second-guessing" of such regulatory judgments, cf. Boyle, 487 U.S. at 511 (identifying design considerations in military equipment selection that exceed engineering
concerns); D'Oench, Duhme & Co. v. FDIC, 315 U.S. 447, 456-59 (1942) (finding
relevant interest to justify application of federal common law even though the statute did not apply to the case before it); Hoke, supra note 8, at 757 (proposing "to
conceive of preemption doctrinal standards as a species of federal common law"). But
cf. Miree v. DeKalb County, 433 U.S. 25, 32 (1977) (holding that government's inter-
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federal common-law rules for extraordinary circumstances,27 s
such interstitial lawmaking is preferable to the tortured feats of
statutory construction that courts engage in when finding
sweeping express preemption of tort claims.
The theoretical difference between interpreting such provisions as dictating preemption of tort claims or as authorizing
courts to fashion a government standards defense may be inconsequential.1 6 Even so, courts could decide that a provision preempting state law demonstrates a sufficiently strong interest in
uniformity (but not exclusivity) to support application of the
government standards defense against tort claims. Regardless of
whether courts style the defense recognized in Cipollone as preemption or government standards, courts should articulate more
clearly the prerequisites for invoking the defense. The three-part
government contractor defense suggests one useful formulation
that could be readily adapted to this end.277
To be sure, significant controversy surrounds use of the government standards defense. Critics make a number of cogent
arguments against the recognition of such a defense to liability.278 For example, the tort system has the virtue of encouraging product manufacturers to discover and address health and

ests in promoting aircraft safety did not justify application of federal common law to
tort suit when Congress had not chosen to displace state law).
275. See, e.g., Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 313 (1981); Wallis v. Pan American Petroleum Corp., 384 U.S. 63, 68 (1966). See generally Martin H. Redish, Federal Common Law, Political Legitimacy, and the Interpretive Process: An "Institutionalist" Perspective, 83 NW. U. L. REV. 761 (1989) (examining the legitimacy of creating
common law); Symposium, Federal Courts, 12 PACE L. REv. 227 (1992) (exploring the
role of the courts in fashioning a federal common law).
276. See Martha A. Field, Sources of Law: The Scope of Federal Common Law, 99
HARv. L. REv. 881, 893-94 (1986) (offering a definition that "leaves no clear-cut line
between federal common law and federal interpretational law"); see also id. at 895
("My thesis is not affected by including cases of interpretation, because the scope of
federal common law power is not a problem in those cases. The problem cases for
federal common law power are the cases in which it is difficult to pass off judicial
").
lawmaking as interpretation ....
277. See Boyle, 487 U.S. at 512.
278. See, e.g., Anita Johnson, Products Liability "Reform": A Hazard to Consumers,
56 N.C. L. REV. 677 (1978) (arguing against doctrines that favor manufacturers and
diminish incentives for safe products); Teresa M. Schwartz, The Role of Federal Safety Regulations in Products Liability Actions, 41 VAND. L. REV. 1121 (1988) (considering effects of shifting products liability law from the courts to regulatory bodies).
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safety risks before they result in serious injuries, whereas regulators generally can react only after such injuries have come to
light.27 Opponents of the defense also question whether administrative agencies reliably protect public health and safety,280 and they add that, in any event, government standards
may be quite difficult to discern and apply.281 Finally, of
course, the federal government generally offers no direct system
of compensation for persons who are injured.28 2
Conversely, supporters offer several justifications for the government, standards defense. For instance, allowing recovery of
tort damages notwithstanding conscientious adherence to carefully crafted safety standards is both inefficient and unfair, and
lay jurors are not qualified to second-guess the safety determinations made by federal regulators." Proponents argue that the
279. See Lyndon, supra note 173, at 167-69, 176 ("Particularly where uncertainty is
endemic, tort law offers advantages as a learning and feedback mechanism."); cf.
Donald Wittman, Prior Regulation Versus Post Liability: The Choice Between Input
and Output Monitoring, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 193, 205-09 (1977) (distinguishing between
ex ante regulation and ex post imposition of liability).
280. See Barry R. Furrow, Governing Science: Public Risks and Private Remedies,
131 U. PA. L. REV. 1403, 1437 (1983); Clayton P. Gillette & James E. Krier, Risk,
Courts, and Agencies, 138 U. PA. L. -REv. 1027, 1064-69 (1990); Schwartz, supra note
278, at 1146-63 (discussing problems of industry influence, obsolescence, and resource
constraints, all of which were especially pronounced during the Reagan Administration); Teresa M. Schwartz, Punitive Damages and Regulated Products, 42 AM. U. L.
REV. 1335, 1344-56 (1993) (same); cf. Peter L. Kahn, Regulation and Simple Arithmetic: Shifting the Perspective on Tort Reform, 72 N.C. L. REV. 1129, 1180-88 (1994)
(preferring to focus on strengthening regulatory standards as a supplement to, rather
than substitute for, tort liability). For a recent summary of some other administrative failures, see Lars Noah, Sham Petitioning As a Threat to the Integrity of the
Regulatory Process, 74 N.C. L. REV. 1, 5-19 (1995).
281. See Schwartz, supra note 278, at 1130-35; see also supra notes 208-14 and accompanying text (discussing the difficulties of gauging compliance).
282. See, e.g., Lyndon, supra note 173, at 172. The National Childhood Vaccine
Injury Act is one notable exception. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 300aa-11 to -15 (1988 & Supp.
V 1993); Shalala v. Whitecotton, 115 S. Ct. 1477, 1478-80 (1995) (describing operation of statute); Lisa J. Steel, Note, National Childhood Vaccine Injury Compensation
Program: Is This the Best We Can Do for Our Children?, 63 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
144, 154-59 (1994).
283. See, e.g., Richard C. Ausness, The Case for a 'Strong" Regulatory Compliance
Defense, 55 MD. L. REV. (forthcoming 1996); James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D.
Twerski, Doctrinal Collapse in Products Liability: The Empty Shell .of Failure To
Warn, 65 N.Y.U. L. REV. 265, 320 (1990) ("IFlor reasons that we find difficult to
understand, courts have not deferred to the determinations of product safety agencies . . . . The analysis usually begins and ends with the statement that agency
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traditional assumptions underlying the hesitancy to accept a
government standards defense are open to serious question in
light of the radical changes in the regulatory state.'
Ultimately, this Article must sidestep the debate, in part
because the propriety of the government standards defense may
well vary across different product categories." 5 Nonetheless,
even critics of the defense should agree that a government standards interpretation of express preemption provisions is far
better than the stronger versions of preemption that a number
of courts have adopted. The government standards defense may
be harder for defendants to establish and more easily overcome
than preemption in any particular case, in the same way in
which the weak version of preemption differs from the two
stronger versions." 6 Moreover, by deciding that preemption
translates into the government standards defense when raised
in the context of tort litigation, courts could decouple the defense

standards are minimum, not maximum, standards and that courts are therefore free
to disregard them."); James A. Henderson, Jr., Manufacturers' Liability for Defective
Product Design: A Proposed Statutory Reform, 56 N.C. L. REV. 625, 639 (1978) (urging recognition of a rebuttable presumption that products that comply with federal
regulations are not defectively designed); Peter Huber, Safety and the Second Best:
The Hazards of Public Risk Management in the Courts, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 277, 33335 (1985) (suggesting that courts should defer to the expert opinions of agencies); W.
Kip Viscusi, Toward a Diminished Role for Tort Liability: Social Insurance, Government Regulation, and Contemporary Risks to Health and Safety, 6 YALE J. ON REG.
65 (1989) (arguing that regulations generate superior risk reduction incentives).
284. See, e.g., Huber, supra note 283, at 334.
285. See Lars Noah, The Imperative To Warn: Disentangling the "Right to Know"
from the "Need to Know" About Consumer Product Hazards, 11 YALE. J. ON REG.
293, 334 n.187, 337-38, 399-400 (1994). Products regulated by the FDA are the most

frequently mentioned as deserving the protections of a government standards defense. See, e.g., STEVEN GARBER, PRODUCT LIABILITY AND THE ECONOMICS OF
PHARMACEUTICALS AND MEDICAL DEVICES xxxii (1993); Richard A. Epstein, Legal
Liability for Medical Innovation, 8 CARDOZO L. REV. 1139 (1987) (urging a safe har-

bor for compliance with FDA warning standards); W. Kip Viscusi et al., Deterring
Inefficient PharmaceuticalLitigation:An Economic Rationale for the FDA Regulatory
Compliance Defense, 24 SETON HALL L. REV.

1437

(1994). But see Margaret

Gilhooley, Innovative Drugs, Products Liability, Regulatory Compliance, and Patient
Choice, 24 SETON HALL L. REV. 1481, 1488-93 (1994) (expressing concerns about ade-

quate funding and public accountability).
286. See supra part III.B.3; see also Atwell, supra note 191, at 227-29 (arguing that
courts should be more hesitant to find preemption of tort claims but adding that
compliance with federal standards should provide a more limited defense to punitive
or excessive compensatory damages).
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and arguments about its desirability from the conceptually different issue of federal preemption of positive state enactments.
V.

CONCLUSION

The Supreme Court decided Cipollone under the rubric of
federal preemption. Perhaps this was an unfortunate choice of
terminology because it has caused great mischief in other contexts. Before 1992, the Supreme Court did not accept preemption
as a defense to tort liability, at least not unless the statute provided a substitute remedy or otherwise granted exclusive jurisdiction to a federal agency. The plurality's judgment in
Cipollone, as refined in a pair of subsequent decisions by the
Court, signalled a new willingness to accept preemption as a defense to common-law tort claims.
A number of lower courts have read Cipollone and its progeny
as an invitation to cut off plaintiffs' access to tort remedies, even
in extreme situations in which a company has not complied with
the federal requirements that are being given preemptive effect.
This strong version of preemption represents the least defensible
reading of Cipollone. The intermediate version, which does not
preempt claims if they are premised on violations of federal
requirements, is somewhat more sensible but arguably still more
protective than Cipollone demands. Instead, the weak version of
preemption, which is really indistinguishable from the government standards defense, may be more in keeping with what the
Supreme Court actually decided in that case. Under this approach, proof of compliance is a predicate for invoking this affirmative defense, and evidence of fraud on the responsible agency
might defeat it.

